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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following anomaly: The law of criminal procedure closely
regulates when a police officer can look in the glove compartment of my car
or ask me questions about a crime, but it pays almost no attention to when (or
how often or how hard or with what weapon) he can strike me. We have very
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detailed law governing a host of evidence-gathering issues, but surprisingly
little-and surprisingly lax-legal regulation of police coercion and violence.
This state of affairs is both strange and wrong: It is also a product of criminal
procedure's odd history.
One aspect of that history is familiar. Fourth and Fifth Amendment law are
the traditional guardians of a particular kind of individual privacy-the ability
to keep secrets from the government. The most famous and important search
and seizure cases of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries involve
government officials rummaging through private papers, subpoenaing private
documents, or eavesdropping on telephone conversations.! Similarly, the
privilege against self-incrimination arose in part from claims that one should
not be required to disclose one's thoughts or beliefs under pain of criminal
punishment.2 This strand of thought about the privilege has mostly died out
today, but as recently as a generation ago privacy was the dominant
explanation for why the privilege existed.3 And the privilege at its heart has
always protected a form of secrecy-the right not to share one's testimony
with the government.
But there is another, less noticed strand of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
history. Privacy protection in the past had little to do with ordinary criminal
procedure. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments arose out of heresy
investigations and seditious libel cases, not murders and robberies. In the late
nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court first took a hand in crafting
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, the key cases involved railroad regulation
and antitrust-again, a far cry from ordinary criminal litigation. In both the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the law's primary effect seems to have
been to make it harder to prosecute objectionable crimes-heresy, sedition, or
unpopular trade offenses in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, regulatory
offenses in the late nineteenth century. To a surprising degree, the history of
criminal procedure is not really about procedure at all but about substantive
issues, about what conduct the government should and should not be able to
punish.
1. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (wiretap of public telephone); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (seizure of obscene literature found during search of boarding house); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (wiretap of suspect's telephone); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
(subpoena for customs invoices); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765) (search
and seizure of papers found in suspect's home); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (C.P.
1763) (same).
2. See infra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing Coke's argument for the privilege).
3. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 450-51 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Robert S.
Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHIcs 87 (1970); Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and
the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. Cr. REV. 193. Not coincidentally, it was conventional to see the privilege as
closely tied to constitutional restrictions on searches and seizures. See Mapp 367 U.S. at 656-57; id at
661-66 (Black, J., concurring).
[Vol. 105: 393
Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure
Fourth and Fifth Amendment history thus has more in common with the
First Amendment and Lochner v. New York4 than with criminal procedure as
we know it today. Fourth and Fifth Amendment law has traditionally limited
government evidence gathering in order to guard individual privacy, but the
limits and the protection have mattered most in settings in which there have
been serious concerns about the government's power to regulate the relevant
conduct. Meanwhile, those bodies of law had only a small ffect on run-of-the-
mill criminal investigations and prosecutions. It is as if privacy protection were
a proxy for something else, a tool with which courts or juries could limit the
government's substantive power.5
This system began to break down near the turn of this century, with the
advent of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Sherman Act, and other statutes
designed to regulate business. These statutes dramatically altered the
substantive effect of constitutional privacy protection, transforming it into a
tool for preventing unwelcome regulation of business. Some courts embraced
this transformation (this was, after all, the Lochner era), but by the end of
Theodore Roosevelt's presidency that path was already largely abandoned.
Foreshadowing the switch in time of 1937, the Supreme Court began to erect
unprincipled boundaries around Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections in
order to limit their restrictive effect on regulatory statutes. Yet the underlying
focus of the law-the idea that the Constitution places great value on one's
ability to keep information out of the government's hands-remained, setting
the stage for the conflicts and inconsistencies that riddle Fourth and Fifth
Amendment law today.
The results of this history can be seen today both in what the law regulates
and in what it leaves alone. If the law of search and seizure now seems
obsessed with evaluating the privacy interest in jacket pockets or paper bags,
that is a consequence of the strong tradition of using Fourth and Fifth
Amendment law as a shield against government information-gathering-a
tradition that has more to do with protecting free speech than with regulating
the police. If privacy seems surprisingly unprotected when government
agencies search regulated businesses or when government employers search
their employees, that is a consequence of the early twentieth-century conflict
between privacy protection and the emerging regulatory state. Finally, if the
law all but ignores police violence outside of interrogation rooms, if it pays
more attention to what police officers can see than to what they can do, that
too is a consequence of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' odd history. Except
for the last generation or so, that history has had surprisingly little to do with
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. For an argument that significant privacy protection always places serious limits on the government's
substantive power, and that the need to escape those limits helps to explain much of the chaos in Fourth
Amendment law, see William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1016 (1995).
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the police. It has had more to do with the substantive law of crimes, with what
activities the government should and should not be able to punish.
Of course, the substantive issues that shaped Fourth and Fifth Amendment
law are long since settled. The government cannot prosecute people for
sedition or heresy. Regulatory crimes abound, and few people think they raise
serious constitutional problems.6 Meanwhile, the law of criminal procedure
still follows the path marked out by these old battles. We have taken a privacy
ideal formed in heresy cases and railroad regulation disputes, an ideal that had
no connection to ordinary criminal law enforcement, and used it as the
foundation for much of the vast body of law that polices the police.
Predictably, the combination has not worked out very well.
Part II of this Article discusses the Fourth Amendment's eighteenth-
century roots. Part I turns to the origins of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Part IV examines the role both doctrines played during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Finally, Part V offers an account of
how we got to where we are, of the transition from Lochner-era Fourth and
Fifth Amendment law to the Warren Court, and from the Warren Court to
today. These discussions are not detailed, and there are no impressive new
discoveries. The basic outlines of Fourth and Fifth Amendment history have
long been fairly clear. I wish only to suggest that those basic outlines,
especially the eighteenth-century disputes that led to the Fourth Amendment
together with Boyd v. United States and its nineteenth-century progeny, paint
a different picture than the one we usually see.
11. THE SUBSTANTIVE ORIGINS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The literature on the Fourth Amendment's origins is sparse, but that may
be because agreement is so widespread. Like the rest of the Bill of Rights, the
Fourth Amendment was prompted by complaints pressed during the
Constitution's ratification.7 Also like other items in the Bill of Rights, the
Fourth Amendment echoed several state constitutional provisions.8 But its real
source, historians seem to agree, was the same as the source of those state
provisions: a trio of famous cases from the 1760s, two in England and one in
the colonies.9 All of the literature on the Fourth Amendment's origins focuses
6. At least that was so until United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (invalidating federal
criminal prohibition of gun possession in vicinity of school).
7. See, e.g., EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 3-33 (1957);
JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 39-41 (1966); Osmond K.
Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361,361-62 (1921). During the ratification
debates in 1787 and 1788, five states proposed a constitutional amendment barring unreasonable searches
and seizures. See DUMBAULD, supra, at 33.
8. See, e.g., LANDYNSKI, supra note 7, at 38; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1176 (1991); Fraenkel, supra note 7, at 362.
9. The three cases are Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765), Wilkes v.
Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (C.P. 1763), and the Boston Writs of Assistance Case, see M.H.
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on these three cases, which were not only well known to the men who wrote
and ratified the Bill of Rights, but famous throughout the colonial population.
Any effort to understand the Fourth Amendment's roots, then, must start with
these cases and the legal context within which they operated.
A. John Entick and John Wilkes
Two of the three cases can be usefully paired, since they have so much in
common. John Entick and John Wilkes were both authors of political
pamphlets critical of the King's ministers. As a consequence, both suffered the
ransacking of their homes and the seizure of all their books and papers, both
sued the officials who ordered or carried out the searches, both won (and
collected substantial damages), and in both cases Chief Justice Pratt (later Lord
Camden) offered ringing declarations about the importance of limiting
executive power to search for and seize private papers in private homes.10
Though all these events took place in England, Entick, Wilkes, and Camden
became quite famous throughout the colonies."
Entick authored a series of pamphlets that authorities thought libelous. In
1762, Lord Halifax, the British secretary of state, issued a warrant authorizing
the seizure of Entick and all his books and papers. Four "messengers," agents
of the Crown, executed the warrant. Entick sued them in trespass and won a
verdict of three hundred pounds.' 2
Camden's opinion upholding the jury verdict in Entick v. Carrington is
stunningly broad. As Eric Schnapper has noted, Camden did not rest his
decision on any technical defect in the warrant (though he did identify
problems with the process that produced it'3); rather, he held that the search
SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978). Both of the standard histories of the Fourth Amendment
focus on these three. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 7, at 19-48; NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEvELOPENT OF THE FOumRH AmENDNENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13-78 (1937). Most
other writers have agreed. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
24-44 (1969); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
257, 283-86 (1984). The only real dispute in the contemporary literature has been whether the writs of
assistance were as important as Entick and Wilkes. Compare Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,772 (1994) (describing writs of assistance dispute as "almost unnoticed
in debates over the federal Constitution and Bill of Rights") with Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 97, 223-28 (1993) (finding disputes over writs of
assistance key to colonial understanding of unreasonable searches and seizures). My argument does not
depend on how this disagreement is resolved, so for purposes of this Article, I will adopt the more common
view, which treats the Writs of Assistance Case as part of the Fourth Amendment canon.
10. See Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029; 1Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153.
11. See Amar, supra note 8, at 1177 & n.209, and sources cited therein. Amar describes Wilkes and
Camden as "folk heroes in the colonies." Id. at 1177.
12. Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1029-36; See LASSON, supra note 9, at 47.
13. E.g., Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1045 (speaking of secretary who issued warrant in Entick.
'"he power of this minister.., is pretty singular."); id. at 1045-51 (explaining why secretary could not
fairly be deemed equivalent to a magistrate).
1995]
The Yale Law Journal
and seizure of the papers was itself impermissible, even with an otherwise
valid warrant:
14
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest
property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly
bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England
be guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and
carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation
of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that
respect.'5
Camden arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding the defendants' claim that
the search was necessary to gather evidence that was in turn necessary to
enforce the law against seditious libel:
[I]t is urged as an argument of utility, that such a search is a means
of detecting offenders by discovering evidence. I wish some cases had
been shewn, where the law forceth evidence out of the owner's
custody by process. There is no process against papers in civil causes.
It has been often tried, but never prevailed....
In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet
there are some crimes, such for instance as murder, rape, robbery, and
house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are more
atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no paper-search in
these cases to help forward the convictions.16
The decision in Wilkes's case was less sweeping only because the facts
were more egregious. John Wilkes was more than an ordinary pamphleteer; he
was a well-known Member of Parliament. He anonymously authored a series
of pamphlets called The North Briton. Number 45 of the series sharply
criticized the King's speech to Parliament and, as with Entick, Lord Halifax
responded by initiating proceedings for seditious libel.' 7 (The warrants in the
two cases were issued six months apart.'8) While the warrant in Entick's case
focused on Entick himself, the warrant in Wilkes's case named no search
target. It directed the messengers "to make strict and diligent search for the
authors, printers and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper, intitled,
The North Briton, No 45... and them, or any of them, having found, to
apprehend and seize, together with their papers .... 9
14. See Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REv. 869, 881-84
(1995).
15. Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1066.
16. Id. at 1073.
17. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 7, at 28; LASSON, supra note 9, at 43; GEORGE RUDt, WILKES AND
LIBERTY 22-23 (1962). By claiming that the King's speech was traditionally viewed as emanating from
the King's ministers, Wilkes tried to avoid directly attacking the King himself. Id. at 22.
18. See LASSON, supra note 9, at 47; Schnapper, supra note 14, at 886.
19. The Case of John Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials 982, 982 (C.P. 1763).
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The messengers carried out their task with enthusiasm, arresting some
forty-nine suspects," including Wilkes, and hauling away all Wilkes's papers
and manuscripts in a large sack.21 Several of the arrestees, again including
Wilkes, then sued in trespass. Wilkes's case came before Chief Justice Pratt
(soon to be Lord Camden-this was shortly before the trial in Entick's case),
who instructed the jury as follows:
The defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons'
houses, break open escrutores, seize their papers, &c. upon a general
warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus taken away,
and where no offenders' names are specified in the warrant, and
therefore a discretionary power given to messengers to search
wherever their suspicions may chance to fall. If such a power is truly
invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate this power, it
certainly may affect the person and property of every man in this
kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.'
The jury, "after withdrawing for near half an hour," found for Wilkes,
awarding him one thousand pounds in damages;z3 a separate suit against Lord
Halifax led to an award of four thousand pounds.24 Wilkes's colleagues were
similarly successful, though the damage awards were smaller.25 Wilkes's fame
and popularity grew dramatically, as much on this side of the Atlantic as in
England.26
Two themes connect these cases. First and foremost, both decisions
emphasize the importance of the privacy interest in homes and papers. This
was the main focus of Camden's opinion in Entick, and though it was less
critical to Wilkes's success, the quoted portion of Pratt's jury instruction
plainly strikes the privacy chord. This interest was, to be sure, wrapped up
with Entick's and Wilkes's property interests-the word "property" appears
more often than "privacy" in these cases. Yet the key to the cases was not the
fact that the papers seized belonged to Entick and Wilkes; rather, the chief
emphasis was on the fact that they were papers, and papers were of such a
private nature that "so far from enduring a seizure .... they will hardly bear
an inspection." 27 Second, both decisions express concern with official
20. See LASSON, supra note 9, at 43-44; RuDi, supra note 17, at 23-24.
21. Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153, 1157 (C.P. 1763).
22. Id. at 1167.
23. Id. at 1168.
24. See LASSON, supra note 9, at 45.
25. See id. at 44. According to Lasson, the expense to the government of defending Wilkes and related
cases, together with the expense of paying the judgments, amounted to roughly one hundred thousand
pounds. Id. at 45.
26. For the best account of Wilkes's reception by his fellow Englishmen, see RODd, supra note 17.
For the best account of his reception by the American colonists, see R.W. POSTGATE, THAT DEVIL WILKES
(1929). See also Amar, supra note 9, at 772 n.54 (noting naming of American towns and counties in
Wilkes's honor).
27. Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1066.
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discretion, a concern reflected particularly in Pratt's rejection of the general
warrant used against Wilkes. The set of cases arising out of The North Briton
No. 45 episode came to stand for the proposition that such warrants are
invalid28-- a proposition later explicitly enshrined in the Fourth
Amendmene 9-- and that arrests must be grounded in some cause to suspect
the arrestee personally of a crime.30 Together, these concerns seem to capture
the essence of the Fourth Amendment, at least from the perspective of the men
who wrote and ratified it.
That much is conventional wisdom. But consider what the first of these
two themes-the idea of a broad right of privacy against the government, a
right focused on personal papers and books-must have meant in practice.
Or, consider what it did not mean. Protecting privacy in cases like Entick
and Wilkes had no effect on the mass of ordinary criminal cases. This seems
counterintuitive: Entick and Wilkes arose out of criminal investigations, and the
Fourth Amendment, which is in a sense their progeny, is a core part of
criminal procedure. But there are at least two reasons why this pair of
decisions must have been largely irrelevant to day-to-day law enforcement.
First, Entick and Wilkes were not themselves criminal cases; both were civil
actions for damages against public officials. They created no entitlement
enforceable in a criminal case; the exclusionary rule was unknown at the
time.3" Thus, nothing in these cases directly changed criminal litigation. If the
target of an illegal search wished to challenge it, he had to sue in trespass. To
be successful he had to have clean hands: in the civil damages action, the
constable could defend himself by showing that the search was successful,
even if it was also illegal. 2 (Of course, it was up to the jury to decide
success.33) This remedial structure ensured that the limits placed on
government investigation in Entick and Wilkes would not affect criminal cases
where (1) the critical evidence was in fact found, or (2) the search target was
too poor or too disreputable to make suing for damages a sensible course of
action. These categories must have covered the great majority of criminal
cases.
28. See, e.g., LANDYNSKI, supra note 7, at 28-29. Note that in Howell's State Trials, Wilkes v. Wood
is labelled "The Case of General Wants." Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1153.
29. The text of the Fourth Amendment states in part that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30. Note that the warrant in Wilkes was general both as to the persons to be arrested and as to the
places to be searched. See LASSON, supra note 9, at 43. Condemnation of that warrant thus tended to imply
condemnation of arrest on mere whim or suspicion, which the warrant authorized.
31. See Amar, supra note 9, at 786-87 (noting Joseph Story's 1822 statement that he had never heard
of a case excluding illegally seized evidence).
32. See id. at 767 & nn.30-33 (citing sources).
33. Thus, in his instruction to the jury in Wilkes v. Wood, Pratt essentially invited the jury to find that
the material found either was not libelous or was not sufficiently tied to Wilkes to exculpate the defendants.
See Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1166-68.
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The second reason is more subtle, and probably more important. Entick
and Wilkes did not cover the kinds of searches that mattered in ordinary
criminal cases, and the kinds of searches that those decisions did cover rarely
occurred in ordinary criminal cases. Consider some basic features of the law
and practice of eighteenth-century criminal investigation. The power to search
incident to arrest-a search of the arrested suspect's person and (if arrested
there) his home-was well established in the mid-eighteenth century, and
nothing in Entick or Wilkes or, indeed, the Fourth Amendment changed that.34
Searches for bloody shirts, murder weapons, and stolen goods, as long as they
were incident to arrest, remained legal, indeed unchallenged.35 Meanwhile,
prearrest searches and seizures played a small role in the investigation of
ordinary crimes. There were no police forces, so the government (in the form
of either the constable or the magistrate) tended to enter the picture no earlier
than the time of arrest, after private citizens had identified the suspected
perpetrator.36 Thus, coercive government searches in ordinary criminal cases
tended to happen after a suspect was identified and an arrest made, not
before-and once an arrest was made, the power to search incident to arrest
allowed the government to gather the physical evidence it needed. Last but not
least, pretrial questioning by magistrates was a central feature of eighteenth-
century criminal procedure. The questioning quite commonly led to a
confession, so gaps in the physical evidence could usually be filled with the
suspect's own testimony.37 All these features of the process show why Entick
34. For the most famous exposition of this point, see TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 27-29.
35. Telford Taylor says they were first challenged in England in the late nineteenth century. Id. at 29;
see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (characterizing search incident to arrest as a
"right on the part of the Government" that was "always recognized under English and American law" and
"has been uniformly maintained in many cases"); cf. JAMES BOYD WHrrE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION
191-92 (1990) (arguing that authority to search incident to arrest may have been available only for certain
purposes, though such purposes included the need to gather evidence).
36. See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCFMENT IN COLONIAL NEW
YORK: A STUDy IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1664-1776, at 387 (1944) (noting that process of initiating
criminal proceedings was much like process by which civil proceedings were initiated); id. at 419-31
(emphasizing use of arrest warrants, which tended to rule out arrest based on constable's suspicion);
ARTHuR P. Scor, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 51-55 (1930) (describing process of
identification and arrest in terms that emphasize role of private citizens and that paint constables and
magistrates as essentially reactive). It is worth noting that the constable himself was more like a private
citizen than like a modern-day police officer. One study of law enforcement in colonial North Carolina
notes that "[c]onstables were local men, from all indications of humble background," and they rarely served
more than a year in office. See Donna J. Spindel & Stuart W. Thomas, Jr., Crime and Society in North
Carolina, 1663-1740,49 J. S. HIST. 223, 227 (1983); see also infra note 59 (discussing colonial evidence
gathering).
In short, criminal investigation was mostly privatized, and even the portion that was not privatized
was, by contemporary standards, the work of amateurs. For a rare (and very good) discussion of this point
in the Fourth Amendment literature, see Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 820, 830-32 (1994).
37. Indeed, if one were to compare eighteenth-century criminal investigation to contemporary practice,
at least with respect to the colonies, pretrial questioning by the justices of the peace seems to have
combined the roles that police investigation and plea bargaining play today-it was the stage at which most
cases were resolved. For two good discussions, see PETER C. HOFFER & WILLIAM B. Scowr, CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA at xxxv-xliv (1984) and Eben Moglen, .Taking the Fifth:
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and Wilkes had little to do with the kinds of evidence gathering that took place
in typical criminal cases.
This is not to say that the privacy protection offered by those cases was
unreal or hypocritical. It is perfectly plausible to conclude that papers as a
category are significantly more private-more the sort of thing that innocent
people would want to keep secret, at least from the government-than the
bloody shirts or contraband one might find in a search of a suspected felon's
home. Camden's famous claim that a man's papers would "hardly bear an
inspection" suggests this point. The fact that cases like Entick and Wilkes
existed shows that the point mattered.
It mattered, however, only in a small slice of cases. Entick and Wilkes
were not suspected robbers; they were pamphleteers. That is no coincidence:
it explains why the government seized their papers and not weapons or stolen
goods. Documents were crucial to the investigation and proof of seditious libel
cases, but they were not an important part of the investigation and proof of
run-of-the-mill crimes. For ordinary criminal cases, or at least the
overwhelming majority of them, the power to search incident to arrest, coupled
with questioning by the magistrate, sufficed to give the government what it
needed to convict--even with a bar on paper searches.
This casts an interesting light on Camden's argument about ordinary
criminal investigation: "[M]urder, rape, robbery, and house-breaking... are
more atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no paper-search in
these cases ... ."'8 One might fairly say the observation is beside the point.
There is no reason to suppose the government needed paper searches in such
cases. Documentary evidence is the key to solving white-collar crime (to use
the modern terminology), not street crime. And white-collar crime in the
eighteenth century had a very different cast than today. It included much less
in the way of business crime, because the mass of regulatory statutes that
define such crimes today did not exist. On the other hand, it did include
seditious libel, a political crime. (It also included trade offenses, which are
addressed in the next section.) Forbidding the search and seizure of Entick's
and Wilkes's papers made these problematic crimes harder to prosecute,
without casting too large a shadow on other, "more atrocious" offenses.
Camden noted this substantive connection, at least indirectly. One portion of
his opinion in Entick discussed the scope of the prohibition of seditious
libel-in particular, the opinion of some authorities that the prohibition might
Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REv.
1086, 1094-1104 (1994).
38. Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1073.
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extend to simple possession of libelous material.39 At the close of that
discussion, Camden stated:
If all this be law, and I have no right at present to deny it, whenever
a favourite libel is published (and these compositions are apt to be
favourites) the whole kingdom in a month or two becomes criminal,
and it would be difficult to find one innocent jury amongst so many
millions of offenders.4"
Camden could not bar the government from exploiting such an overbroad,
substantively unjust prohibition; hence the interjection, "I have no right at
present to deny it."' A ban on paper searches, however, would place a major
obstacle in the government's path, making prosecution significantly harder, and
thereby preventing some of the worst abuses.
What happened to Entick and Wilkes was not purely a problem of
substance. The searches and seizures in those cases did indeed raise procedural
concerns,4 2 and those concerns surely mattered to the courts and people who
embraced the decisions. But two points about this pair of cases stand out in
stark relief. First, Entick and Wilkes are classic First Amendment cases in a
system with no First Amendment, no vehicle for direct substantive judicial
review. Restricting paper searches had the effect of limiting government power
in a class of cases that were, even at the time, deemed seriously troubling in
substantive terms, as shown not only by Camden's remarks in Entick but also
by the public's embrace of the two decisions.43 Second, we have no evidence
of important contemporaneous search and seizure litigation arising out of run-
of-the-mill criminal investigations, investigations of "more atrocious" crimes.
And there is a thoroughly plausible explanation for why such litigation would
39. See id. at 1071.
40. Id. at 1072.
41. To be sure, Camden did not believe in doing away with seditious libel, and was eager to avoid
any appearance to the contrary. Thus, he closed his opinion in Entick with a peroration against libels, see
id. at 1074 ("I will always set my face against them, when they come before me; and shall recommend it
most warmly to the jury always to convict when the proof is clear."), and licentiousness, see id. ("When
licentiousness is tolerated, liberty is in the utmost danger; because tyranny, bad as it is, is better than
anarchy; and the worst of governments is more tolerable than no government at all."). Still, he seems to
have found the broadest version of the offense quite problematic on essentially substantive grounds.
42. Particularly the concern with government discretion, a problem to which I will return below. See
infra Section 1I.B (discussing the IVrits of Assistance Case).
43. This connection between substance and process holds true not only for Entick and Wilkes; it also
holds true for much of the early history of American civil liberties. Consider the following discussion of
early Pennsylvania law and its grant of a range of liberties to that colony's residents:
The various frames of govemment, concessions, and grants of liberties that Penn issued during
the 1680s, 1690s, and into the early eighteenth century contained what amounted to a bill of
rights, including a guarantee of jury trial, counsel, and freedom from illegal search and seizure.
The ill-usage of the Quakers in England by officers of the law bent on rooting out the sect
influenced Penn's plan, as did a vision of a good society open to all peaceful emigrants.
PETER C. HOFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 31 (1992). Once again, what we would see
as First Amendment problems led to the creation of procedural rights because there was no legal tradition
that allowed direct substantive limitation on government power.
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not have existed. Given the absence of an exclusionary rule, the legality of
searches incident to arrest, and the prevalence of uncounseled questioning by
magistrates prior to trial, the government could get what it needed to convict
without the use of searches of the sort that led Entick and Wilkes to sue.
B. The Writs of Assistance
The third canonical case took place in America, not England, and it was
a defeat for those who sought protective search and seizure rules. Nevertheless,
the argument that lost in the courtroom in the famous Boston Writs of
Assistance Case prevailed with the men who later wrote the Bill of Rights.'
The dispute concerned the enforcement of British customs laws in colonial
ports, and especially in Boston. There were two major sets of rules, both
probably designed more to restrict trade than to raise revenue. The colonists
had to pay high duties on any molasses imported from the non-British West
Indies. Molasses was of course key to the rum trade, and it was available in
greater quantities and at better prices from the French- and Spanish-ruled
islands. The British duties sought to discourage the trade between those islands
and New England. The second set of rules, known as "the staple," required
that goods imported from continental Europe be shipped through British
ports.
45
British statutes appeared to give customs officials almost unlimited
authority to search for and seize goods imported in violation of these rules.
The Act of Frauds of 1662 authorized customs officers
to enter, and go into any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room,
or other Place, and in Case of Resistance, to break open Doors,
Chests, Trunks and other Package, there to seize, and from thence to
bring, any Kind of Goods or Merchandize whatsoever, prohibited and
uncustomed .... 46
The Act of Frauds of 1696 applied this authority to customs enforcement in
the colonies.47 And this power was indeed exercised, albeit only sporadically,
during the first half of the eighteenth century. Before writs of assistance made
their first appearance in Boston in 1756, customs searches in the colonies were
based on statutory authorization alone, on some conception of inherent power,
44. See sources cited supra note 9.
45. The two best-known sources on the Writs of Assistance Case are SMrrI, supra note 9, and O.M.
Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE. AMERICAN REVOLtION
40 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939). Much of the discussion in this section relies heavily on these two
sources, especially Smith's thorough book.
46. Act of Frauds § 5(2) (1662). reprinted in SMITH, supra note 9, at 25. This Act codified already
existing authority. See William Cuddihy & B. Cannon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle: Origins
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 380-81 (1980).
47. See SMmil, supra note 9, at 51-58.
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or even on general warrants issued by colonial governors.4" But while
customs searches existed, they must have been rare: enforcement of the trade
rules was lax, and violations were both rampant and blatant. It is not too much
to say that Boston's economy in this period was grounded on an illegal
trade.49 Moreover, for much of this time, goods could not be forfeited except
on a jury verdict, and New England jurors were unfriendly to strict
enforcement of the customs laws. Thus, even when goods were seized, there
was a fair chance that the seizure would quickly be undone. 0
Three things happened beginning in the mid-1750s to change this picture.
First, British trade policy shifted. War with France raised concerns about trade
protection and revenue, and these concerns prompted stricter enforcement of
customs rules. The second development was the fortification of a system of
vice-admiralty courts that could decide condemnation (i.e., forfeiture)
proceedings without the aid of a jury.51 Third, the colonial courts began to
issue writs of assistance. These writs, authorized by the two Acts of Frauds,
were not themselves a grant of authority; rather, they enabled customs officers
to compel others-constables, local officials, or even private citizens-to assist
in carrying out the necessary searches and seizures. They did not purport to
create authority but to confirm it, and to render its use easier. But the writs
became wrapped up with the search authority they sought to confirm. And the
scope of that authority was very broad indeed: language in the writs harked
back to the Act of Frauds of 1662, permitting searches of any place where
prohibited goods or goods subject to duties might be, based solely on the
suspicion of the customs officer. To top it all off, each writ ran for the life of
the King.52
48. See id. at 115-23; see also LASSON, supra note 9, at 55 (these searches "seemfl to have been
unopposed for a long period of time"). But see Maclin, supra note 9, at 218-22 (arguing that searches were
quite controversial). From the incidents reported in the major secondary sources, it seems that customs
searches became a cause c4labre only in the mid-eighteenth century.
49. As Smith puts it:
But the [Molasses Act] could never have worked anyway. The aim was to break and recast a
firmly established pattern of commerce in a region with not much diversification of
economy-far more than the modest custom house staffs, even though expanded a little for the
purpose, could possibly have accomplished.
SMrrH, supra note 9, at 61. The predictable consequence was lax enforcement: "[U]ntil the 1750s, when
in desperation for revenue London began thinking hard, the men at the top gave not two straws about the
Molasses Act and how it was working" and hence "tumed] a blind eye [to] the minuscule receipts"
collected by the customs officials. Id.
50. A portion of the 1696 Act was designed to eliminate the jury's role in these cases, but Smith
argues that poor drafting and colonial resistance prevented this change from taking root. See id. at 52-57.
The result was that the vice-admiralty courts created following 1696 were largely ineffective. See id. at
70-71 (discussing non-enforcement of the staple).
51. The fortification came chiefly through judicial appointments favorable to more rigorous
enforcement of the trade laws. See id at 86-87, 93-94.
52. See id app. L at 559-61 for a specimen, and Id. at 95-124 for discussion of the writs used in
Massachusetts in the 1750s. On the writs as confirming authority but not creating it, see Dickerson, supra
note 45, at 45-46.
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Beginning in 1756, several writs were issued to various officials in and
near Boston. In late 1760, after the appearance of a London magazine article
suggesting that the writs were incompatible with British practice,53 one of
them was challenged. The challenge took on special importance when, shortly
thereafter, King George II died, meaning that existing writs would shortly
expire absent judicial reauthorization.54 The Superior Court in Boston heard
the case, in which James Otis famously represented the merchants (and likely
smugglers) who sought to eliminate the writs, and along with them the broad
power to search for customs violations.
Otis's argument was partly statutory; he claimed that the Acts of Frauds
did not confer the broad authority that their language seemed to suggest. But
he also argued that if the statutes did authorize suspicionless searches, they
were not good law. The substance of the argument reads like a precursor to
Wilkes v. Wood:
Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the
freedom of one's house. A man's house is his castle; and while he is
quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it
should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege.
Custom house officers may enter our houses when they please-we
are commanded to permit their entry-their menial servants may
enter-may break locks, bars and every thing in their way-and
whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can
inquire-bare suspicion without oath is sufficient.55
The argument lost; the writs were upheld. But Otis and his argument became
famous. John Adams later said that Otis had, in effect, fired the first shot of
the Revolution.56
Otis's argument raises the same pair of concerns as Wilkes: privacy in the
home coupled with a fear of unbridled official discretion. These concerns are
53. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 132-34, 142-43. The article, copies of which apparently circulated
widely in Boston in 1760 and 1761, stated that the writs should be granted only when the authorities had
reason to believe that the prohibited or dutiable goods would be found in the place to be searched. LONDON
MAG., Mar. 1760, reprinted in SMrrH, supra note 9, at 537-39. Moreover, it went on to say that "if such
a warrant should be granted without any reasonable or solid ground of suspicion, and no such goods should
upon search be found, I am apt to suspect, that an action would lie against the grantors, and that the
plaintiff, in that action would recover damages & costs." Id. at 538.
54. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 134-40. It was not the case that the writs were only challenged after
George II had died; the challenge had already been lodged. But the death of George II made the existing
case a good deal more important, because now the validity of all other writs in Massachusetts was at stake.
Id. at 142-43.
55. James Otis, Address, reprinted in SMnTH, supra note 9, at 344.
56. As Adams put it, "Then and there the child Independence was bom." Letter from John Adams to
William Tudor (Mar. 29, 1817), reprinted in SMrTH, supra note 9, at 253. Otis's fame is partly due to
Adams's later account of the case, and Adams's account-especially his conclusions about the
contemporaneous importance of Otis's speech-is subject to serious challenge. See SMITH, supra note 9,
at 248-52; see also Dickerson, supra note 45, at 42-43 (noting that speech was not widely reported when
it was given).
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obviously procedural in nature, for they go to the manner of criminal
investigation rather than the substance of the crimes being investigated. Yet as
with Entick and Wilkes, opposition to the writs of assistance cast no great
shadow on ordinary criminal investigation; also as with Entick and Wilkes,
opposition to the writs did cast a shadow, and a very large one, on a
substantively troubling kind of government regulation. Both points follow from
the key difference between law enforcement in the eighteenth century and law
enforcement today. For us, policing is the job of the police. In Otis's day it
was the job of the whole citizenry, because police forces did not exist.
Today, the law of search and seizure largely adopts Otis's argument by
requiring probable cause and a warrant (or a good excuse for not getting one)
for a legal search of a home." These rules unquestionably limit the
investigation of ordinary crimes. Police decide when and whom to arrest, and
those decisions often come after a good deal of investigation. That
investigation, in turn, is again driven by the police, for they are the ones who
decide when and where to search. Since evidence of ordinary crimes can often
be found in people's homes, the probable cause and warrant requirements for
house searches significantly limit police discretion, and tend at the margins to
push the police toward other forms of evidence gathering.
In mid-eighteenth-century America, on the other hand, someone reported
a crime to the constable or magistrate and the constable made the arrest, or
private parties arrested the culprit on their own.5" Arrests were sometimes
unjustified. Yet there was no serious problem of seizures based on nothing but
the desire of the police to harass, for there were no police. Nor, for the same
reason, were there many prearrest searches, justified or not: the government's
agents usually did not enter the picture until arrest or shortly before.59 Most
57. Indeed, the law has gone further, requiring probable cause and a warrant in order to make an arrest
in a private home as well. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573 (1980).
58. See SCOTr, supra note 36, at 50-55. The line between private parties and the constable was a fine
one, given the system of private "watchmen" who policed the cities. See DOUGLAS GREENBERG, CRIME
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF NEW YORK, 1691-1776, at 156-58 (1974). The watchmen
were in effect acting constables. Throughout much of the eighteenth century, at least in New York, there
was a serious shortage of real constables, id. at 167, making the role of the watchmen especially important.
59. Thus, accounts of colonial criminal justice tend to emphasize three kinds of evidence gathering,
none of which is analogous to modem-day prearrest police investigation. The first is private--the
"evidence" comes from the knowledge common to neighbors in what were usually very small communities.
See, e.g., HOFFER & SCOTr', supra note 37, at xxvii-xxviii, which describes the role of the grand jury in
one colonial Virginia county:
Their eyes and ears went where the justices' did not .... When Christopher Pridham made
unwanted advances to his maidservant or Thomas Livack threatened to "do some bodily hurt"
to a neighbor, they knew and presented the culprits to the court.
See also ScoT'T, supra note 36, at 52-53 (noting that colonial Virginia arrests usually took place when
private party reported crime and suspected criminal to justice of the peace, who then issued warrant for
suspect's arrest); GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 36, at 337-38 (same in colonial New York). The
second is the search incident to arrest. See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 27-29. The third is examination by
the magistrate. See HOFFER & SCOTt, supra note 37, at xxx, xxxv-xliv; Moglen, supra note 37, at
1094-1104. The basic picture seems clear. Prearrest evidence gathering was delegated to the community
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searches were probably incident to arrest, and those searches were legal even
when the search was of the arrestee's home.60 Nothing in Otis's argument
would have changed that conclusion. The problem of discretionary,
suspicionless searches and seizures in ordinary criminal cases is an incident of
organized police forces-of a system that gives to police officers the job of
investigating crimes, identifying suspects, and choosing which suspects to
pursue. James Otis's America did not have organized police forces.
Consequently, the central evil that infected the writs of assistance, the evil that
Otis so vigorously and eloquently attacked, cannot have been a significant
feature of day-to-day criminal law enforcement.
Where, then, did Otis's argument matter? Precisely in the setting in which
he made it: the enforcement of unpopular victimless crimes, prohibitions that
both lacked public support and created no aggrieved private party who wished
to have the wrongdoer caught and punished. Even with public support, such
offenses are hard to enforce, for without a victim the system cannot readily
know when an offense is committed. That is as true of drug offenses today as
it was of adultery or trade offenses in 1760. Twentieth-century police,
however, have an advantage in enforcing the drug laws that eighteenth-century
officials did not have: the manpower and resources to infiltrate the citizenry.
The cooperation of private citizens always makes law enforcement easier, but
a significant level of enforcement of the drug laws is possible without any
cooperation from private parties, simply because of the size and strength of
police forces. That was not the case two-and-a-half centuries ago. Without the
help of ordinary citizens who reported offenses and identified offenders,
criminal law enforcement could not go forward, because there were no police
forces to make it go forward. With respect to victimless crime, such
cooperation can only flow from a general desire to see the law enforced. So,
for example, if adultery and blasphemy laws were enforced to any substantial
extent in the American colonies, it was because a large enough portion of the
community generally agreed with the norms on which those offenses rested.
When the support faded, enforcement faded with it.
61
This acceptance of the law must have been a prerequisite for vigorous
enforcement of any victimless offense in the eighteenth century. If the public
thought the law wrong, no crimes would be reported, no arrests made, and the
system would break down. That is essentially what happened to the trade laws
at large; government evidence gathering was designed to fill gaps in the evidence and took place after
arrest, not before.
60. See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 27-29. The legality of searches incident to arrest is probably a large
part of the reason why, as Cuddihy and Hardy show, discretionary searches of private homes remained
common even after Wilkes v. Wood, both in England and in the American colonies. See Cuddihy & Hardy,
supra note 46, at 385-91.
61. On the enforcement of such laws generally, see David H. Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of
Morals in Early America, 5 PERSP. AM. HisT. 203 (1971). See also id. at 233-39 (noting connection
between declining enforcement of morals laws and declining public support for them).
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that the colonists opposed. Those laws were unenforceable by the usual
procedures because the population did not think the prohibited conduct bad.
That is why the vice-admiralty courts were necessary: juries would not
condemn the seized property. It is also why the writs of assistance were
necessary: customs officers needed to draft help because voluntary aid was
scarce. Finally, without the help of private citizens, officials were not likely to
know where smuggled goods were hidden, making the power to follow
hunches and to conduct suspicionless searches essential.
So Otis's argument had bite, but-like Camden's opinions in Entick and
Wilkes-it had bite in a narrow class of cases. If the writs were not valid, the
trade laws would be much harder to enforce. Little else would change. The
dispute over the writs, in short, had at least as much to do with the regulation
of trade-with the substance of the rules being enforced-as with general
principles of search and seizure. After all, broad search authority for customs
officers had been around for a long time before anyone heard of James Otis.
It only became contentious in the 1750s and 1760s because that is when
British trade policy changed course. Had Otis's argument been adopted, its
practical effect would have been to restrict the enforcement of unpopular trade
rules while leaving the rest of the criminal justice system untouched.
C. Warrants and the Role of Juries
All three of the Fourth Amendment's canonical cases involved some kind
of search warrant. To a reader familiar with late twentieth-century criminal
procedure, that should seem odd. Today most disputed Fourth Amendment
issues concern warrantless searches and seizures. Warrants are supposed to
protect citizens-when the police have one, that usually means they did what
they were supposed to do. Cases involving warrants are the least likely to raise
serious legal issues.
This reaction is exactly backward when one turns to the eighteenth
century. As Akhil Amar has noted, the Fourth Amendment was phrased as a
limitation on warrants rather than a warrant requirement because of the
colonists' hostility to the use of warrants as a defense to trespass litigation.62
Warrants were seen to provide inappropriate refuge for government
misbehavior. This view seems strange today because Fourth Amendment law
62. For the best exposition of this point, see Amar, supra note 8, at 1178-81. The Fourth Amendment
reads, in its entirety, as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. There is no warrant requirement to be found in this language. Nor was the idea
of a broad modem-style warrant requirement a part of the Founders' picture of search and seizure law, as
Telford Taylor made clear a quarter-century ago. See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 23-50.
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is enforced primarily in suppression hearings, so that warrants serve as an
additional hoop the government must jump through in order to avoid having
evidence excluded. In the eighteenth century limits on search and seizure were
enforced, if at all, in trespass actions, and warrants were raised, if at all, as a
defense. Warrants were a pro-government tool, not a protection for the
citizenry.63
A warrant provided an effective defense against a trespass claim because
it established the legality of the search, creating a kind of legal "safe harbor."
Thus, warrants in the eighteenth century, where valid, transferred the issue of
the legality of the search from the jury in a subsequent trespass action to a
judge or executive official (the secretary of state in Wilkes and Entick), acting
both ex parte and ex ante. Hostility to warrants meant hostility to this
procedural shift, to taking power away from civil juries.
Conversely, decisions like Entick and Wilkes, by rejecting the use of
warrants to authorize certain types of searches, empowered juries to decide
whether the government's conduct was justified. As Amar again has argued,
that power was quite open-ended.64 The best analogy is not modem
suppression hearings where judges decide whether the police had probable
cause-i.e., whether there was a sufficiently high likelihood that they would
find evidence of a crime. Instead, the right analogue is negligence cases, where
juries make substantive judgments about whether the defendant's behavior was
reasonable under the circumstances. Juries had something akin to a power of
substantive review; they were free to impose liability based in part on the
nature of the offense being enforced, not just the likelihood that the search
would turn up evidence.65 Such broad authority gave juries the ability to
separate cases like Entick and Wilkes from cases involving more ordinary
crimes.
Juries' role in enforcing search and seizure law did not dictate that that
law would affect only investigations of pamphleteers or smugglers. But broad
jury power did make this kind of separation possible. As with Entick's bar on
paper searches, and as with Otis's argument in the Writs of Assistance Case,
63. This is almost a logical necessity-in any damages system warrants are likely to be a pro-
government tool, for that is the only normatively plausible role they can play where damages are the chief
remedy for illegal searches. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L.
REv. 881, 899-910 (1991) (explaining how warrants serve as safe harbor for government officials in
damages liability regimes).
64. See Amar, supra note 9, at 774-78.
65. And they did so. For examples, see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of
the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 874-75 (1994). For a sampling of the large
literature on eighteenth-century juries as finders of law as well as fact, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 20-30 (1975); Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the
Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND
CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 399, 401-04 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., ed., 1991); Note, The Changing Role of
the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 171-76 (1964). See also JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE,
THE JURY 24 (1994) (in the colonial period, "local juries outranked Parliament when it came to announcing
what the law was in Massachusetts").
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the colonists' hostility to warrants fit neatly with a system in which search and
seizure law served mostly to restrict the investigation of "crimes" that much
of the population thought should not have been crimes to begin with.
Meanwhile, limits on the use of search warrants probably had no effect on
more run-of-the-mill criminal investigations. In a system with no police forces,
prearrest investigation (such as it was) was essentially privatized; coercive
government searches happened at arrest. The combination of the search
incident to arrest and questioning by the justice of the peace must have been
enough to satisfy the government's evidentiary needs in all but a few cases.
Search warrants in ordinary criminal cases were apparently unknown.66
Limiting them may have made it harder to prosecute people like Entick and
Wilkes, but it cannot have made much difference in bringing murderers or
robbers to justice.
1H1. THE SUBSTANTIVE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Fifth Amendment's origins are a good deal harder to pin down than
the Fourth's, which is why the former has generated so much more literature
than the latter. Among historians there are basically two schools of thought.
According to the first, the privilege against self-incrimination entered the
common law in seventeenth-century England. Its adoption was prompted by
practices that smacked of political or religious persecution, but it was applied
across the board in criminal cases. This is the view of Dean Wigrnore,67 and
more recently of Leonard Levy,68 author of the leading book on the subject.
According to the second school of thought, the seventeenth-century adoption
of the privilege was more sham than real, at least in the colonies, and probably
in England as well. This is the view taken by Julius Goebel and T. Raymond
Naughton in their study of criminal procedure in colonial New York;69 more
recently, John Langbein has extended the argument to England and connected
the privilege's supposed irrelevance with the absence of defense counsel in
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century criminal litigation.7"
These positions do not really contradict one another.7 On the contrary,
taken together they paint a picture that strikingly resembles the development
of restrictions on searches and seizures. The privilege entered the law in
response to practices that were troubling in large part because of the crimes
66. See GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 36, at 428-29.
67. See 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2250, at 3078-92 (1904).
68. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968).
69. GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 36, at 652-59.
70. John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common
Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994); see also Moglen, supra note 37, at 1112-21 (arguing that rise of
privilege against self-incrimination and rise of trial by jury are intimately connected).
71. Though to read these writers' references to each other's work, one might think otherwise.
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being prosecuted-crimes of religious belief or political expression. It was
applied to all crimes, but it made no practical difference in ordinary criminal
litigation because of the way such litigation was conducted. The picture is of
a procedural device that served substantive ends.
A. The Sources of the Privilege
On the Levy-Wigmore view, the chief spur to the creation of the privilege
was the oath ex officio, a practice employed by English ecclesiastical courts in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that engendered great controversy and
was eventually abandoned under fire.72 Though hotly criticized, the oath ex
officio was really quite ordinary; it was nothing more than an oath
administered to the accused by which the accused swore to answer truthfully
the questions put to him. The controversy stemmed not so much from what the
oath demanded as from the context in which it was used. As objectors
ceaselessly pointed out, the accused was given the oath before he was told
what, if any, charges were to be lodged against him. Indeed, the "charges"
might be mere rumors since no accuser need be called to testify. And while the
oath ex officio may have been used in a variety of cases, it prompted protest
mostly in heresy prosecutions. In these cases, according to the common
practice, the accused-invariably suspected of being either a Catholic or a
Puritan, and hence an opponent of the Church of England73 -would be sworn,
asked questions about his own religious views and practices, and then
(sometimes) asked about the views and practices of his acquaintances. The
court would pass judgment, often branding the suspect a heretic based on his
own sworn testimony. A great many of these cases, leading to a great many
imprisonments and executions, took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries during the period spanning the reigns of Henry VIII and Charles I.'
What, precisely, was wrong with this procedure? Opponents of the oath
often claimed it involved a species of torture, that it "'put the conscience
uppon the racke."'7 5 There was something to this complaint, especially in a
time when people took oaths and swearing a good deal more seriously than
they might today. But it is hard to believe that the sustained criticism of the
oath ex officio rested primarily on the cruelty of the choice it posed; after all,
72. One problem with this view is that it downplays the privilege's sources in medieval Church law,
which held that a Christian who confessed his sin to a priest was not thereby obliged to confess the same
sin (even if it was legally punishable) to the civil authorities. See Richard H. Helmholz, Origins of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 982
(1990). Langbein emphasizes this point in criticizing the Levy-Wigmore view. See Langbein, supra note
70, at 1072.
73. Except, of course, during the reign of Queen Mary, when persecution was turned on Anglicans.
74. The uses and criticisms of the oath ex officio are surveyed in LEVY, supra note 68, at 43-204.
75. Id. at 177 (quoting statement made around 1591 by Thomas Cartwright and eight Puritan
colleagues on oath ex officio).
[Vol. 105: 393
Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure
this was an era when real racks, not metaphorical ones, were employed with
some regularity, and where filthy, cold dungeons or hangmen's nooses awaited
those judged guilty. The cruelty of hard questions pales next to other practices
that prompted no outcry. Critics also made much of the oath's timing, which
gave the accused no notice of what he was to be asked. This made it easier,
so the claim went, for the interrogators to "entrap" the victim with unexpected
questions.76 Yet this feature of the oath does not distinguish it from ordinary
pretrial questioning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries or, for that
matter, from police interrogation today." Moreover, in many of the cases
Levy recounts the victims knew well what they were suspected of. Absence of
notice often seems to have been a formal complaint only.
Contrast the weakness of these claims with the strength of the standard
defense of the oath: it could hold no terror for the innocent, since only those
with crimes to confess needed to fear questioning, and they feared questioning
only because of their crimes. On this argument, complaining about the oath
was a little like a thief complaining about the search of his knapsack because
it uncovered stolen goods. The innocent suspect would welcome the search as
long as it was motivated by the genuine desire to catch a thief, because it
would clear him of suspiciofi. The guilty suspect deserved no sympathy for
having his crime uncovered.78
The real answer to this argument, one that crops up again and again in
Levy's account, was substantive. Those who were being questioned were more
like the innocent suspect than the thief, because the "crimes" in question
should not have been crimes.7' This was so in at least three distinct senses.
First and most obviously, the proceedings in question involved the punishment
of religious expression-expression that the suspects saw as compelled by
God. As with Entick and Wilkes, these were First Amendment cases in a
system without a First Amendment. Complaints about the oath thus served as
a procedural substitute for a freedom of religious expression that did not exist.
Second, as applied by the High Commission under Queen Elizabeth or King
James, heresy covered masses of ordinary citizens. That is why questioning
could easily entrap generally innocent parties: they might not know where their
practices crossed the line into heresy, because the crime was so protean."0
76. See, e.g., id at 150 (quoting 1586 statement of Giles Wigginton, a Puritan hauled before the High
Commission who refused to answer questions).
77. On the breadth of the power of pretrial examination by justices of the peace in colonial America,
see Moglen, supra note 37, at 1094-1104. On the legality of using surprise in police interrogation today,
see generally Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987) (authorizing police questioning about crimes other
than ones for which suspect was arrested, without any advance warning to suspect, and without invalidating
suspect's earlier waiver of his Miranda rights).
78. For a good discussion of this argument, see LEvY, supra note 68, at 159-61.
79. For some examples of this claim, see id. at 138, 141-42, 269, 279.
80. In his Commentaries, Blackstone attributed past abuses in the prosecution of heretics largely to
the "uncertainty of the crime," to its lack of clear definition. 4 vILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*45.
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Here the attack on the oath ex officio played something like the role vagueness
doctrine (or the due process concern with fair notice) plays today.
Third and finally, the offense had a large element of pure thought to
it-hence Coke's complaint that "'no free man should be compelled to answer
for his secret thoughts and opinions.,, 81 Coke's complaint is couched in
privacy language; it is also an attack on the substance of the crime of heresy.
The overlap is no accident. Heresy could only be enforced with procedures that
intruded unacceptably on individual privacy. A crime of religious observance,
heresy was classically victimless. And like all victimless crimes, it had an
obvious enforcement problem. Heretics were not likely to generate a pool of
accusers eager to ferret out the criminals and publicly finger them in court.
There were only two ways to enforce such an offense: get the perpetrators to
confess or get their confederates to turn state's evidence. The perpetrator, of
course, did not wish to confess, and his confederates did not wish to accuse
him, since they were engaged in the same activity as he, and did not believe
it wrong.
These features of the crime are precisely what made the oath ex officio
necessary. As Thomas More wrote (before the procedure was turned on him),
if the oath procedure were abandoned, "'the stretys were lykely to swarme full
of heretykes.' ' 12 Archbishop Whitgift, leader of the High Commission in
Queen Elizabeth's day, explained that heretics "'spreade their poison in secrete,
making it nearly impossible to produce witnesses against them."'' 3 Absent the
ability to put suspects under oath (so they would fear lying even more than
they would fear confession-remember that these "criminals" were profoundly
religious people) and force them to answer questions about themselves and
their coreligionists, heresy could not be proved, at least not often enough to
make it worthwhile for the government to prosecute.
Thus, the government used the procedure that prompted the claim that "no
man is bound to accuse himself'--the claim that later became our privilege
against self-incrimination-for some of the same reasons that made the crime
of heresy objectionable. Like the trade laws in eighteenth-century New
England, heresy was a "crime" committed by men and women who considered
themselves law-abiding and were probably so considered by their communities.
81. LEvY, supra note 68, at 245 (quoting Jenner's Case, Stowe MS. 424, fols. 159b-160a (1611)); see
also Edward's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1421, 1422:
And in cases where a man is to be examined upon his oath, he ought to be examined upon acts
or words, and not of the intention or thought of his heart; and if every man should be examined
upon his oath, what opinion he holdeth concerning any point of religion, he is not bound to
answer the same .... And so long as a man doth not offend neither in act nor in word any law
established, there is no reason that he should be examined upon his thought or cogitation: for
as it hath been said in the proverb, thought is free ....
82. LEvY, supra note 68, at 65 (quoting THOMAS MORE, APOLOGY OF SYR THOMAS MORE KNYGHT
219a-227b (1533)).
83. Id. at 139 (quoting document sent from John Whitgift to Lord Treasurer Burghley (July 15, 1584)
in 1 JOHN STRYPE, THE LIFE AND ACTS OF JOHN WHrrGIFr 321-22 (Oxford, Clarendon 1822)).
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Consequently, like Boston's smugglers, heretics could only be caught and
punished by special procedures that allowed the government to gain access to
private material (in 1750s Boston, people's homes and warehouses; in the High
Commission and Star Chamber, suspects' testimony about their religious
beliefs) by force, and without showing probable cause or specifying the basis
for the investigation. In both instances the procedures led to a great deal of
public criticism; in both instances the criticism had a strong substantive
undertone. As Levy puts it: "Powerless to redefine the substantive law that
made their activities criminal, the Puritans turned to the common law courts
and to legal obstructionism"-to procedural arguments, and especially to
arguments against the oath--"as a means of self-defense."8 As was true of
James Otis's arguments about the law of search and seizure, the privilege
claims made by religious dissidents dragged before the High Commission were
bound up with concerns about the crime for which those dissidents were being
punished-and those concerns were in turn bound up with the manner in which
the crime in question had to be enforced. The arguments were about procedure,
but in this context procedure and substance were inseparable.
This connection between procedure and substance held true as well in the
later cases that, according to Levy and Wigmore, solidified the privilege's hold
in English law. John Lilburne regularly claimed the privilege in his famous
mid-seventeenth-century trials for seditious libel. According to Levy, his jury
acquittals should be taken, in part, as validation of those claims.85 While
Lilburne was not a heretic, he was a political figure, a pamphleteer, a critic of
the government, and a very popular man.16 His popularity-shown by the fact
that a jury acquitted him of authoring seditious material, some of which bore
his name87 -must have made it quite important for the government to get
damning statements from his own mouth, since a jury might seize on any
excuse for acquitting him. If this is what Lilburne's prosecutors feared, their
fears were borne out: Lilburne refused to answer questions about authorship
of the seditious material that was the basis of the charge against him; he
argued, implausibly, that the material might well be forged, and the jury
acquitted."
So too with John Entick. Entick's case, the reader will recall, involved the
search and seizure of books and papers, not compelled testimony in court.
Entick sued the officials who had performed the search for trespass. In his
84. Id. at 216.
85. See id. at 271-313; see also 3 WVIGMORE, supra note 67, § 2250, at 3088-89.
86. See G.P. GoocH, ENGLISH DEMOCRATIc IDEAS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 124 (1927)
(referring to Lilbume as the "most popular man in England"). He was also given to picking fights: "He was
obstreperous, fearless, indomitable, and cantankerous, one of the most flinty, contentious men who ever
lived. As one of his contemporaries said, if John Lilbume were the last man in the world, John would fight
with Lilbume and Lilbume with John." LEVY, supra note 68, at 272.
87. See LEVY, supra note 68, at 307-09.
88. See id. at 307.
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famous opinion upholding the jury verdict in Entick's favor, Lord Camden
declared such "paper searches" unlawful, in part because they amounted to
compelled self-incrimination:
It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself;
because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling
upon the innocent as well as the guilt3, would be both cruel and
unjust; and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed
upon the same principle.89
This prohibition could not have affected the mass of criminal cases, where
paper searches were unnecessary, but it did make it more difficult to punish
seditious pamphleteers like Entick. Here, as in Lilburne's case and the High
Commission's many heresy trials, the argument for the privilege served as an
obstacle to the prosecution of substantively problematic crimes.
B. The Privilege's Procedural Setting
Even if the privilege was born in cases involving heretics or pamphleteers,
it was never framed in substantive terms. The claim was not that suspected
heretics should be free from compelled self-incrimination, but that everyone
should be. Accordingly, one might reasonably expect the privilege to have
worked a revolution in criminal procedure as it was applied to run-of-the-mill
cases of murder, rape, or robbery.
That did not happen. The procedural setting in which the privilege arose
dictated that it would make no difference in most cases, especially given the
way criminal procedure worked in the American colonies. There are two key
points here. First, the privilege was a trial right. It did not affect pretrial
questioning, which was not conducted under oath. 0 Second, at the trial itself,
the privilege mattered little unless the defendant had a lawyer-someone who
could speak for him without the defendant having to speak for himself.9" As
John Langbein has noted, defendants were not allowed to have lawyers in
many cases until the early to mid-eighteenth century.92 Even after that, the
use of lawyers at trial was rare-again especially in America, where lawyers
were often in short supply.93
89. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1073 (1765).
90. See Langbein, supra note 70, at 1059-62; E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
34 MiNN. L. REV. 1, 14-22 (1949). Note that notwithstanding the absence of a strong privilege in pretrial
examination, the state was constrained in the methods it could use to induce confessions, see id. at 18-just
as, prior to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the police were constrained by due process
voluntariness doctrine in their efforts to get suspects to confess.
91. This is the central argument of Langbein, supra note 70.
92. See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. Ca. L. REv. 263 (1978).
93. Of course lawyers were rarest in the seventeenth-century American colonies. See, e.g., HoFFFR,
supra note 43, at 40-42. Throughout the eighteenth century the right to counsel spread, and the use of
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Thus, the picture in all but a few criminal cases looked like this:94
Defendants were questioned by a magistrate without benefit of counsel, and at
this questioning the defendant usually confessed. It was often suggested that
if the defendant resisted the charges the system would go much harder on him.
The trial was usually a formality. Even if the defendant refused to confess, any
slip-ups he made in the course of pretrial questioning would be used against
him at trial. Magisterial questioning functioned as police interrogation does
today; it offered the government an opportunity to get whatever information
it could from an uncounseled, and frequently frightened and confused,
defendant. The difference is that today, defendants can stop all questioning and
get legal help before any further conversation with the government."
Although many defendants do not exercise this right, at least some do, and the
prospect surely affects the course of questioning even in the many cases where
Miranda rights are never invoked. No such entitlement existed in the
eighteenth century, and the privilege did not alter that picture in the slightest.
Of course, the privilege presumably did apply at trial, and that ought to
have made a difference in some cases. As Langbein rightly emphasizes,
however, a right to remain silent at trial means little without a lawyer: if the
defendant does not have a spokesman, his silence leaves the government's case
unanswered.96 This might be a plausible strategy (albeit a risky one) in a
highly formalized system with elaborate trial procedures and a beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard of proof. Eighteenth-century American criminal
procedure did not have these features. Trials were quick and casual, and the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard did not exist.97 In such a system,
defense counsel became more common, id. at 85-87, but they remained the exception rather than the rule.
Hoffer sums up his discussion of the advancing right to counsel in these terms: "[B]y the 1760s, counsel
was permitted felony suspects in more than half the colonies," id. at 86 (emphasis added)--hardly a picture
of a lawyer-dominated criminal process like the one we know today. See also GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra
note 36, at 573 (noting that "counsel was only occasionally employed in criminal cases" in eighteenth-
century New York); id. at 574 ("[O]nly on points of law could counsel appear in felony cases, and there
is no evidence that the colonial judges indulged prisoners beyond this limit as sometimes occurred in
England."). Perversely, the use of counsel was more common in misdemeanor cases, where the right to
counsel had deeper roots, than in felony cases, where defendants presumably needed help the most. Id.
94. For a fairly standard picture of the process, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 24-27 (1993). The great variable from place to place and time to time
seems to have been the use of juries--rare in some colonies at some times but commonplace in others. See
id. at 26; see also DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: MIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY
24 (1992) (noting that defendant's request for jury in New England was often held against him at
sentencing).
95. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that if defendant invokes his Miranda right
to counsel, questioning must cease and may not resume except at defendant's initiation); see also Arizona
v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (holding that Edwards rule applies even to questioning about different
crimes).
96. Langbein, supra note 70, at 1054 ('The right to remain silent when no one else can speak for you
is simply the right to slit your throat, and it is hardly a mystery that defendants did not hasten to avail
themselves of such a privilege.").
97. See id. at 1056-57. For the most thorough discussion of the history of the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard, see BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT' AND "PROBABLE CAUSE":
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 1-41 (1991). Shapiro's account
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decisionmakers' likeliest assumption is that the charge is true unless it is
effectively answered. From the defendant's point of view, silence was a bad
idea; indeed, as Langbein and Eben Moglen note, the entire system seemed
designed to get the accused to talk.9
When, in such a system, would a privilege against self-incrimination have
mattered? Only when a defendant had (1) a great deal of fortitude (for standing
up to the magistrate under questioning); (2) either a lawyer to speak for him
at trial (and hence the money to hire a lawyer) or enough education to speak
for himself without answering incriminating questions (like Lilbume, that
amazingly talkative claimant of the right of silence99); and (3) lastly, some
hope of success from silence, meaning enough popular support to negate the
system's ordinary bias toward conviction. Not everyone accused of religious
or political offenses satisfied these conditions, but some did. Men charged with
murder or theft did not. It is no coincidence that the privilege's origins read
like a catalogue of religious and political persecution.1t° It was potentially
a valuable right in such cases, and it was almost meaningless in others.
C. Privacy, Substance, and the Privilege
In theory, the privilege covered all incriminating information; some even
argued that it covered all embarrassing information, whether incriminating or
not. '0 In practice, its scope was smaller. Most incriminating testimony was
suggests that the governing standard throughout the eighteenth century was unclear. "The most common
directives to the jury included phrases like 'if you believe' or 'if you believe on the evidence,' 'if you
believe what the witness swore,' and 'if the evidence is sufficient to satisfy your conscience."' Id. at 14.
These vague formulations were gradually replaced by the familiar reasonable doubt rule beginning late in
the eighteenth century. See id. at 21-25.
98. Hence their label for the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century criminal process: the "accused
speaks" trial. See Langbein, supra note 70, at 1048; Moglen, supra note 37, at 1094. This is the real basis
for Goebel and Naughton's conclusion that the privilege in its essentials did not exist in colonial New York.
See GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 36, at 652-59. For a sharp criticism of that conclusion, see Leonard
W. Levy & Lawrence H. Leder, "Exotic Fruit": The Right Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination in
Colonial New York, 20 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1963).
99. See, e.g., The Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilbume, 4 Howell's State Trials 1270 (1649),
where Lilburne claims his right of silence with astonishing verbosity.
100. For the same reason, it is probably no coincidence that claims of the privilege declined after the
Glorious Revolution. The privilege was chiefly an obstacle to the punishment of dissidents, and such
punishment declined after 1689. See LEVY, supra note 68, at 323-24.
101. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445-54 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (endorsing
and discussing history of this argument). Douglas maintained that the privilege protected any information
that would subject the witness to "infamy," a term that seemed to encompass almost anything that would
be harmful to the witness, even if the harm was intangible. For an earlier judicial argument along the same
lines, see Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 631-35 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting). Note that some of the
Puritans harrassed by the High Commission also argued for a privilege that would protect them from being
forced to testify in ways harmful to others. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 68, at 163 (discussing testimony
of one witness who "refused to answer any question concerning herself, because, she said, 'she would not
be her own Hangman,' nor would she implicate confederates because 'she could not in her conscience, be
an Accuser of others'). Of course, the "infamy" argument made by Douglas and Field and the claim that
the privilege forbade compelling people to inform on their neighbors tended to reinforce each other-both
suggest a privilege that would prevent compelled disclosure of anything private.
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unaffected by the privilege for the procedural reasons discussed above. Still,
the privilege did effectively protect some testimony, testimony that (again for
procedural reasons) would tend to arise in prosecutions for political or
religious belief. As the many challenges to the oath ex officio showed,
questioning in such cases had a strong tendency to focus on the suspect's
thoughts. °2 At least after Entick v. Carrington, the privilege affected another
category of evidence as well. Searches of suspects' private papers were
apparently forbidden in part because they violated the privilege.
Just as paper searches probably constituted a greater privacy intrusion than
other searches, questioning of the sort done by the High Commission in heresy
cases probably invaded privacy more than other questioning. In other words,
the privilege at its inception seemed to protect the most private sorts of
potentially incriminating information, while leaving the rest largely untouched.
And as we have seen, the most private sorts of information tended to be used
in the most substantively problematic prosecutions. The suspect's testimony
about his thoughts mattered more in heresy prosecutions than in robbery cases.
A robber's state of mind could be proved by his conduct; this was less true
where the crime itself hinged on belief. Similarly, paper searches mattered
most when the crime involved possession or authorship of seditious or
heretical writing. In other cases, the government would rarely need a
defendant's books or correspondence.
Thus, perhaps even more so than with search and seizure law, the
privilege's origins show that in the era leading up to independence there was
a near identity between protecting informational privacy and hindering the
prosecution of objectionable crimes. It may not be clear which was the chicken
and which was the egg, but it seems clear enough that privacy protection and
substantive constraints on government power traveled together. To put it
differently, privacy protection always limits the government's substantive
power, 3 and if that limit was not the prime reason for these restrictions on
criminal law enforcement, it was at least a happy byproduct.
IV. THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS IN THE LOCHNER ERA104
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law was not terribly important during
America's first century. Federal criminal prosecutions were rare, and federal
prosecutions were the only ones to which the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
applied. 0 5 Even if one considers state law restrictions on evidence gathering,
nineteenth-century search and seizure and self-incrimination doctrine did not
102. Recall Coke's criticism of the punishment of citizens for their "secret thoughts and opinions."
See supra text accompanying note 81.
103. For a discussion of why this is so, see Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1029-34.
104. A condensed version of the discussion in this part appears in id. at 1049-54.
105. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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have a major impact on the criminal justice system. Search-incident-to-arrest
doctrine and pretrial questioning continued to ensure that in most ordinary
criminal cases the government could obtain evidence from the accused fairly
easily without raising serious constitutional issues. The law of search and
seizure and self-incrimination might have played the same role it did in the
eighteenth century, inhibiting the prosecution of political crimes-for such
crimes existed, especially at the state level.'06 But political prosecutions in
the nineteenth century do not seem to have prompted Entick- or Wilkes-style
claims.1 °7 With a couple of notable exceptions (for instance, the scope of
Fifth Amendment immunity' 8), the law governing search and seizure and
self-incrimination was basically dormant, both at the federal level and in the
states.
Of course, the picture was not quite that simple. The criminal justice
system was undergoing great changes. Defense lawyers came to play a much
more significant role in ordinary criminal cases than at the time of the nation's
founding.'09 This meant that the privilege against self-incrimination could
seriously affect the way such cases were adjudicated: if represented, defendants
could feasibly stay silent and let their lawyers do the talking. Moreover, the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard had become fairly well entrenched in the
law by the mid-nineteenth century."0 This too rendered silence a more
plausible strategy for defendants, which in turn made the privilege something
more than just window dressing. By the same token, one can find a scattering
of early nineteenth-century trespass suits against sheriffs for illegal searches
or arrests that arose out of ordinary investigations"'-quite unlike Entick or
106. Political crimes existed briefly at the federal level, during the short life of the Sedition Act of
1798. See generally JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1951). The
phenomenon was more widespread at the state level, given the Southern desire to suppress antislavery
speech. See, e.g., RUSSEL B. NYE, FEITERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY
CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860, at 80-85 (1963) (discussing prosecutions of Southern whites for possession
or distribution of antislavery literature). But cf. WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION:
SECESSIONISTS AT BAY, 1776-1854, at 98-118 (1990) (arguing that out-of-court coercion dwarfed sedition
laws in importance in suppressing white antislavery speech).
107. The absence of early nineteenth-century analogues to Entick and Wilkes is no great surprise.
Entick and Wilkes (and John Lilbume, for that matter) succeeded in large part because their position was
popular. The political criminals of the first half of the nineteenth century were mostly antislavery agitators
in the South, see supra note 106-not a group likely to engender much public sympathy.
108. The relevant cases are surveyed in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 565-86 (1892).
109. FRIEDMAN, supra note 94, at 245 (noting that lawyers in felony cases were increasingly common,
especially late in the nineteenth century when a number of states began to offer state-paid counsel). Even
toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, counsel remained the exception rather than the rule. See
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 1870-1910, at 185 (1981) (noting that over one-fourth of all felony
defendants in Alameda County were given appointed counsel).
110. For a contemporaneous discussion that both traces and bemoans the advent of the reasonable
doubt standard, see Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases, 10 AM. L.
REV. 642, 651--64 (1876).
111. Most of the cases involve the search of the plaintiff's home pursuant to a warrant. The usual
result was a victory for the defendant on the ground that a valid warrant absolved the one performing the
search of any civil liability. See, e.g., Walker v. Hampton, 8 Ala. 412 (1845); Beaty v. Perkins, 6 Wend.
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Wilkes. To some degree, the privacy protective rules spawned by Wilkes,
Entick, and Lilburne were becoming part of ordinary criminal procedure.
Yet if restrictions on search and seizure and self-incrimination had
penetrated criminal procedure to a much greater extent than in the eighteenth
century, those restrictions were still at the margins of the system. Even in
cases tried to juries, defendants were often unrepresented, and where they were
represented, pretrial questioning afforded a way of honoring privilege claims
without disabling the government from using the defendant's own
incriminating statements. And trespass actions were probably too expensive to
be anything other than rare. Though the law of search and seizure and self-
incrimination mattered, there is no evidence that it mattered much.
Boyd v. United States,112 decided in 1886, changed all that. Boyd
inaugurated an era in which criminal procedure again played a critical role and,
as in the eighteenth century, the role was substantive. But the nature of the
substantive restraint was quite different. In the eighteenth century, the
substantive implications of protecting privacy in general, and privacy in
documents in particular, mostly bore on political crimes. In the late nineteenth
century, privacy protection cast a large shadow on the regulation of business.
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law thus fit the larger pattern of
constitutional law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
standard story about constitutional law between 1880 and 1940 runs about like
this: The court system, with the Supreme Court taking the lead,
constitutionalized laissez-faire, then, yielding to political pressure, did an
about-face and left economic regulation to the politicians. As an account of the
flow of constitutional law in general, this story is exaggerated at best."3 As
a picture of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law it is closer to the truth, though
the dates are not quite right. Through Boyd and subsequent decisions, the
382 (N.Y. 1831). Where the plaintiff prevailed, one of two factors was usually present: The warrant was
outside the scope of the issuing magistrate's authority (and so could not provide a defense to the sheriff),
or the sheriff carried out the search in an impermissible fashion. For an example of the first situation, see
Thurston v. Adams, 41 Me. 419 (1856) (holding that warrant authorizing search for liquor kept for personal
use, where possession of liquor for personal use was not crime, did not absolve officer of liability). For an
example of the second, see Malcom v. Spoor, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 279 (1847) (holding that constable who
attached plaintiff's furniture pursuant to valid warrant, but then left furniture with an intoxicated deputy,
abused warrant and therefore was not protected by it).
112. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
113. In fact, during this period most regulatory measures were upheld; cases like Lochner were more
exceptional than conventional wisdom suggests. See Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the
Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,
1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 978-81 (1975) (noting that even Justice Field--the progenitor of
aggressive substantive due process--took care not to constrict government power too much). In addition,
the goal of Lochner-style substantive due process was not to bar all regulation (or even all legislative
regulation), but to ensure that regulation served the public interest and was not merely redistributive. For
two quite divergent discussions of the period that nevertheless reach these same conclusions, see HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEmED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE (1993) and HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at
171-204 (1991).
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Supreme Court adopted a view of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments that might
have made a great deal of economic regulation constitutionally impossible at
the federal level.114 Then, faced with growing political pressure for
regulation, the Court yielded-not during the Great Depression, but during the
administration of the first President Roosevelt.
In fact, the progress of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries closely parallels the conventional
Lochner"5 story. Yet there is one important difference. When the Court did
its about-face, it did not abandon privacy in the way that the New Deal Court
abandoned laissez-faire constitutionalism. Privacy was not cast aside, but
cabined within arbitrary boundaries that limited its substantive reach. This set
the stage for the tension---one that pervades Fourth Amendment law
today-between privacy protection and the post-New Deal constitutional order.
A. The House that Boyd Built
Though it is a landmark of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, Boyd was
not a typical criminal case; in fact, it was not a criminal case at all. Boyd
imported glass to be used in the construction of some government buildings.
As part of his agreement with the government, he was permitted to bring some
of the glass into the country without payment of import duties. According to
Boyd, early shipments had a great deal of breakage, so later shipments were
brought in duty-free to compensate. The government believed otherwise, and
proceeded to seek forfeiture of thirty-five cases of glass under a federal statute
that permitted forfeiture in cases where import taxes were evaded through
misrepresentation. The proceeding was civil and in rem; Boyd was not a
named party and the only possible penalty was loss of title to the thirty-five
cases of glass
1 1 6
The statute authorized subpoenas for relevant documents in such cases, and
the government obtained a subpoena for the invoices on twenty-nine cases of
glass that had been shipped earlier. (Depending on the quantity and value of
these earlier shipments, Boyd might not have been entitled to bring the later
shipments in tax-free.) Boyd objected that the subpoena was unconstitutional,
114. It might have made a difference at the state level as well, since some state courts were following
the same path as a matter of state law. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing Boyle
v. Smithman, a late nineteenth-century Pennsylvania case that adopted an extreme version of Boyd as a
matter of state law).
115. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
116. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-18; Brief for Plaintiffs, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
(No. 983), reprinted in 8 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 479, 480-85 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); Brief for
the United States, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (No. 983), reprinted in 8 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 505, 506-09.
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but was nevertheless ordered to produce the invoices. He did so, and the thirty-
five cases were then found to be forfeitable." 7
The Supreme Court overturned this judgment, holding that the subpoena
for the invoices violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Justice Bradley's
majority opinion dealt with three issues. First, the Court held that because the
production was compelled rather than voluntary, the subpoena was the
functional equivalent of a search or seizure and hence was covered by the
Fourth Amendment."' Second, the Court found that this "search" was
unreasonable.1 9 The Court said, basically, that the Fourth Amendment
adopted Entick v. Carrington, and Entick expressly barred the search and
seizure of documents as evidence. 20 At the close of several pages of near-
continuous quotes from Camden's opinion, Bradley stated:
The principles laid down in [Entick] affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the
concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious
circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employ[ees] of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life.1
2 1
As in Entick, this protection of "the privacies of life" was linked not only to
restrictions on search and seizure but also to the privilege against self-
incrimination. The Court likened a subpoena for documents to the "compulsory
extortion of a man's own testimony,"' and regarded both as violating the
privilege so long as the case qualified as criminal. As Bradley put it, "In this
regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other."'"
The third and final issue was whether those amendments could have any
application in what was, after all, civil litigation. The Court found this issue
easy, holding that all "suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the
commission of offences against the law, are of [a] quasi-criminal nature,"'2 4
and that this was enough to bring them within the spirit of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments (though concededly not within those amendments' "literal
terms"'2).
Boyd was a radical decision, though not in terms of its effect on ordinary
criminal cases: subpoenas for documents, like paper searches, were surely a
marginal feature of criminal law enforcement. (The case law of the following
117. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-20.
118. Id. at 621-22.
119. Il at 622-35.
120. Id. at 626-30.
121. Id. at 630.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 634.
125. Id. at 633.
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two decades provides some negative evidence for this proposition. Although
many cases, state and federal, dealt with variations on the Boyd scenario or
applied Boyd to various fact settings, almost none involved ordinary crime,
unless one counts fraud prosecutions.) But Boyd's reasoning had potentially
huge effects on business regulation. Consider Boyle v. Smithman,126 an 1892
Pennsylvania case that adopted Boyd-style reasoning-though without citing
Boyd, since the relevant law was state rather than federal. Pennsylvania had a
statute requiring persons in the business of transporting and storing oil to keep
records of how much oil they had on hand, where it was stored, and so forth.
Boyle, a newspaper publisher, tried to force Smithman, an oil merchant, to
produce the required records. 27 The court might have held that only the
government was entitled to enforce the statute, but it instead found for
Smithman on a much broader ground. It held that forcing Smithman to produce
the relevant records would violate the privilege against self-incrimination
because the statute specified penalties for any defaults in record-keeping.'28
In other words, Smithman could not be required to disclose his records because
the records themselves might be inadequate, and if they were, Smithman might
have to pay a fine. This holding apparently applied no matter what the nature
of the proceeding or who asked for the records. The documents in question
were papers, they were therefore private, they belonged to Smithman, and their
disclosure might subject him to regulatory penalties. That was that.
Boyle shows nicely just what Boyd might have meant for the emerging
regulatory state. If people could not be forced to disclose records because they
might have violated a record-keeping rule, the government could not have
record-keeping rules, at least not meaningful ones. And if requiring the keeping
of records was impermissible, a good deal of regulation would be, in practical
terms, impermissible as well. Meanwhile, more direct disclosure-asking
someone to turn over documents in order to show whether the suspect had
violated some conduct rule-was barred by Boyd itself. Nor could the
government get around this restriction by searching for the documents rather
than issuing a subpoena: Boyd treated searches and subpoenas the same. Nor
was oral testimony an acceptable substitute, because its use would violate the
privilege against self-incrimination. People like Boyd and Smithman were,
potentially, immune from a great deal of compelled disclosure, and
consequently exempt from a great deal of government regulation.
The two arguments most commonly made by opponents of an income tax
throughout this period-that such a tax was "inquisitorial" and that it promoted
perjury 29-demonstrate the breadth of this line of reasoning. These are
126. 23 A. 397 (Pa. 1892).
127. Id. at 397.
128. Id. at 398.
129. See ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913, at 47 (1993).
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classic self-incrimination arguments; they recall the language used by Puritans
hauled before the High Commission. The same arguments support the position
the Boyd Court took: that the government should neither seize nor compel the
production of a citizen's records or papers, even when the government's
regulatory interest is strong. And Boyd was itself a tax case.
Nor is Boyd aberrational in this respect. A striking development in the
nature of Fourth and Fifth Amendment litigation seems to have taken place in
the two decades following Boyd. The reported cases, both state and federal, are
filled with disputes about business regulation. There are a number of
bankruptcy cases in which the bankrupt sought to avoid certain kinds of
compelled disclosure.1 30 Antitrust cases began to crop up following the
Sherman Act in 1890, with defendants raising Fifth Amendment objections to
subpoenas or questioning. 13' Railroad regulation disputes were especially
common and especially high profile, as several such cases made their way to
the Supreme Court. 13 2 These cases were not all resolved in defendants' favor;
not all courts carried Boyd's logic as far as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Boyle. 33 Yet the potential for serious interference with government
regulation-interference whose source was not the Due Process Clause but the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments-was plainly present.
The railroad cases are particularly interesting. The year after Boyd was
decided, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, which prohibited some
forms of price discrimination by railroads and shippers. Five years later, the
Supreme Court decided Counselman v. Hitchcock."M In the course of a grand
jury investigation into illegal price discrimination, Counselman was asked
whether he had ever transported grain into Chicago for less than the posted
rate. He declined to answer, claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege. 35 The
Court reaffirmed and extended its Boyd holding that the privilege applied
outside the bounds of an actual criminal prosecution,'36 but it did not stop
there. The Act already provided that Counselman's testimony could not be
130. E.g., In re Harris, 164 F. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1908); In re Hess, 134 F. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1905); Potter
v. Beal, 49 F 793 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892).
131. The most famous of these was Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
132. The railroad cases constitute the bulk of the Court's Fourth and Fifth Amendment caselaw in the
two decades after Boyd. See ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896);
ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
133. For example, in In re Harris, 164 F. at 294, the court held that the debtor in a bankruptcy
proceeding should turn over his books and papers to the trustee, and if the government ever wished to use
them as evidence in a criminal case, the trustee would not surrender them until the bankrupt had been able
to invoke his constitutional privilege just as if his books and papers had remained in his possession. Harris
makes an interesting pair with In re Tracy & Co., 177 F. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1910), in which the recently
appointed Judge Learned Hand ruled that where the debtor already had turned over his books to the trustee,
he had thereby waived any claim of privilege he otherwise might make, id. at 534-35.
134. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
135. See id. at 548-50.
136. Id. at 562-64. "Extended" is the appropriate word here. Boyd left open the possibility that its
restrictions would apply to trial proceedings but not to preliminary proceedings like the grand jury
investigation in Counselman. The Court's decision in Counselman foreclosed that possibility.
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used against him in any subsequent criminal prosecution; the government
maintained that this statutory use-immunity satisfied the privilege, and that
Counselman should therefore have to answer the questions put to him. 37 The
Court disagreed and held that Fifth Amendment immunity must be absolute,
barring any subsequent prosecution for anything about which the defendant
testified, even if the government relied on other evidence. 131 Congress
answered with a new immunity provision, specifying that no one could be
prosecuted for any transaction covered by compelled testimony (or, of course,
by documents produced under subpoena) in any Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) investigation. 139 In Brown v. Walker, the Court upheld
this provision, but (in dicta) construed it to bar prosecutions for state as well
as federal crimes. 40 The combination of Counselman and Brown made it
possible for the ICC to obtain documents and testimony from railroad officials
and their customers, but only at the cost of wholly immunizing the witness or
the party producing the documents. The immunity applied not only to direct
criminal punishment, state or federal, but to forfeitures (as in Boyd) or,
presumably, other civil penalties that the government might seek to impose.
Since the immunity came with the testimony and since the privilege applied
to ICC or grand jury proceedings as well as formal trials, these holdings forced
the ICC to immunize potential wrongdoers before it could know who was
guilty and who was innocent-that is, it had to immunize wrongdoers as the
cost of investigating wrongdoing. No wonder that some judges concluded that
if the logic of these cases were to be followed, the ICC would be disabled
from doing its job.
141
137. See Brief for Appellee at 10-19, Counselman (No. 1026), in 10 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 116, at 591, 601-10.
138. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 585 ("We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party
or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the effect
of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States."); id. at 586 ("[A] statutory
enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which
the question relates."). The Court went on to note that the statute in question impermissibly allowed the
government to use the compelled testimony to "gain[] therefrom a knowledge of the details" of the case
and then to use that "knowledge" in prosecuting the witness. Id.
139. See Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 443. The new statute provided on the one hand that "no person
shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts,
agreements and documents before the Interstate Commerce Commission,. .. on the ground.., that the
testimony or evidence ... required of him, may tend to criminate him .... Id. at 443-44. On the other
hand, it added: "But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on
account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena .... Id. at 444.
140. See 161 U.S. 591, 606-08 (1896).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 96 F. 960, 962 (D. Ky. 1899) (restricting scope of defendant's
Fifth Amendment immunity under Interstate Commerce Act, and noting that if immunity were not so
restricted, defendants would find it easy to immunize themselves for wrongdoing by getting themselves
summoned as witnesses). Note that in Brown v. Walker itself, four Justices were prepared to strike down
even the revised immunity statute-i.e., to hold that the ICC could not compel testimony or the production
of documents even if full transactional immunity were granted the witness. See 161 U.S. at 610, 627-28
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There was an obvious, if partial, response to this problem. The key to
railroad regulation-perhaps the key to almost all economic regulation-was
the ability to direct the conduct of corporations. Boyd and Counselman made
it much harder to punish corporate officers, but they did not necessarily
hamper the regulation of the corporations themselves-as long as Fourth and
Fifth Amendment protection covered natural persons but not artificial ones.
Yet a turn-of-the-century observer might well have thought that Boyd and
Counselman would apply to corporations, that the privilege against self-
incrimination-with its attendant limits on the compelled production of
documents-would cover institutions as well as individuals. Wigmore, a
careful and astute reader of the cases, thought so,42 and there were strong
arguments to support his position. The same year it decided Boyd, the Supreme
Court held that corporations were "persons" for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 43 The Fifth Amendment, including the privilege against self-
incrimination, protected "persons" as well,' 44 and the Fourth Amendment
protected the rights of "the people."' 45 If artificial persons counted in the
later Amendment, it seemed plausible to suppose that they would count in the
earlier ones as well.
Protecting corporations was also consistent with the privacy/property value
that Boyd identified as the foundation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
The corporate form is, after all, a means by which a group of people
collectively hold property and. make contracts. Requiring the corporation to
produce records is no different from requiring the corporation's shareholders
to produce records that the shareholders jointly own.146 Or, to focus less on
property and more on privacy, documents that belong to the corporation
(Shims, J., joined by Gray and White, JJ., dissenting); id. at 628, 630-33 (Field, J., dissenting). The Court
responded:
If, as was justly observed in the opinion of the court below, witnesses standing in Brown's
position were at liberty to set up an immunity from testifying, the enforcement of the Interstate
Commerce law or other analogous acts, wherein it is for the interest of both parties to conceal
their misdoings, would become impossible, since it is only from the mouths of those having
knowledge of the inhibited contracts that the facts can be ascertained.
Id. at 610.
142. See 3 WIGtORE, supra note 67, § 2259, at 3116 (calling the issue "plain").
143. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
145. Id. amend. IV.
146. This functional argument, the idea that one had to protect the corporation to protect the
shareholders, may have been the basis on which corporations were initially treated as "persons" under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See MORTON J. HORwriz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 69-70 (1992). According to Horwitz, the pure legal fiction of corporate
personality, the idea that corporations were no different than natural persons under the law, did not take
hold until the end of the nineteenth century. See id. at 70-74. Of course, the fiction did not completely take
hold even then; states continued to regulate corporations differently from natural persons. See Charles W.
McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporation Law,
1869-1903, 53 Bus. HIST. REV. 304, 314-19 (1979). Even if one treated corporations and natural persons
differently for some purposes, however, it was hard to justify treating them differently for purposes of
Boyd, which itself involved documents used in the course of running a business.
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necessarily contain private information about the corporation's owners or
employees; it seems formalistic to deny both the employees and the owners
control over the information solely because it is held in the corporate form.
As the twentieth century approached, these arguments looked more than
plausible; they looked right. Yet if they had been adopted, the modem
regulatory state would have been dead almost before it was born. Indeed, it
may be fair to say that at about the time of Lochner v. New York, Fourth and
Fifth Amendment law posed a greater threat to activist government, at least at
the federal level, than did substantive due process. Boyd, like Entick, treated
the search and seizure of papers as at least presumptively impermissible, on the
ground that papers were both private and the legitimate property of their
owner, and Boyd took the further (wholly logical) step of applying Entick's
rule to subpoenas. It would take another step, though again a logical and easily
imaginable one, to apply that rule to institutions as to individuals. Had such
a step been taken, the result would have been, as in Entick, a substantial
restraint on the power of government to regulate wherever regulation had to
be enforced through the compulsory use of the regulated party's documents.
Though Boyd had led to significant restrictions on federal railroad regulation
and sporadic limits in other areas, it had not yet transformed the regulatory
landscape. Transformation was, however, just around the comer.
This shadow on economic regulation highlights the key difference between
Boyd and Entick. Like Entick, Boyd mattered most to cases far removed from
ordinary criminal law. But Boyd's substantive shadow was much more
controversial. Entick affected seditious libel prosecutions and little else, and by
the mid-eighteenth century seditious libel was probably already fading. Boyd-
era Fourth and Fifth Amendment law cast a shadow on a host of regulatory
arrangements at a time when the popularity of such arrangements was rising,
not falling.
B. Boyd's Collapse
The conflict between Boyd's protection of "the privacies of life" and the
government's authority to regulate business came to a head in 1906 in Hale
v. Henkel.'47 Hale involved a grand jury investigation of possible Sherman
Act violations. Hale, the secretary-treasurer of the MacAndrews & Forbes
Company, was asked to turn over all documents concerning MacAndrews &
Forbes's relationship with six other firms. 4 ' Hale objected on three main
grounds: 4 9 (1) the grand jury had no general authority to inquire into
147. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
148. Id. at 45; Brief for Appellant at 1-4, Hale (No. 340).
149. Hale's brief contains a laundry list of overlapping arguments; the categorization used in the text
is accurate but simplified, and it omits some claims. See, e.g., id. at 58-63 (arguing that proceedings below
violated Tenth Amendment).
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possible crimes absent particularized suspicion;150  (2) the subpoena
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure;' and (3) turning over the
documents would violate the corporation's privilege against self-
incrimination.' Each argument looked quite plausible. The government's
claim that grand juries had broad inquisitorial power sounded uncomfortably
similar to the claims of the special tribunals that had used the oath ex officio.
The grand jury's witnesses were not told about possible charges, because the
charges were to arise out of the documents and testimony collected by the
grand jury. The search and seizure claim seemed a natural outgrowth of Boyd.
Indeed, if corporations were covered by the Fourth Amendment, Boyd appeared
to dictate the result in Hale's case. 3 Finally, the corporate privilege
argument, as I have already noted, was embraced by no less an authority than
Wigmore.
54
Nevertheless, Hale's first and third arguments lost, and the second won
only the smallest of victories. On the first claim, the Court invoked the
tradition of broad grand jury power and concluded that while "[d]oubtless
abuses of this power may be imagined," courts would "be alert" to deal with
them when they arose.' 5 This was, of course, more an assertion than an
argument. The Court was even more dismissive of the claim that Hale's
corporate employer had its own privilege against self-incrimination (a privilege
that its agent Hale could presumably invoke). The Court rejected that claim in
a single result-oriented paragraph, 5 6 the key passage of which reads as
follows: "[T]he privilege claimed would practically nullify the whole act of
Congress. Of what use would it be for the legislature to declare these
combinations unlawful if the judicial power may close the door of access to
every available source of information upon the subject?"'57 The Court made
the same point when it rejected the claim that any subpoena for corporate
documents would violate the corporation's Fourth Amendment rights, adding
that corporations, unlike individuals, were creatures of the state and hence not
ordinarily the bearers of constitutional protections.158 Because this reasoning
150. See id. at 12-41. This was the central point of Hale's brief; throughout the discussion Hale placed
great emphasis on the inquisitorial nature of the grand jury and its consequent potential for compelled self-
incrimination.
151. Id. at 63-87.
152. In part this argument was subsumed within the Fourth Amendment argument since, under Boyd,
searches and seizures were "unreasonable" when they tended to compel self-incrimination. However, both
the main brief and the reply brief raised the corporation's Fifth Amendment claim directly. See id. at
85-87; Appellant's Brief in Reply at 15-21, Hale (No. 340).
153. Boyd, like Hale, was a case involving a subpoena for documents, and Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892), already had held that the Fifth Amendment applied to such subpoenas in grand jury
proceedings. The only way to distinguish Boyd, therefore, was to deny that its protection extended to
corporations.
154. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
155. Hale, 201 U.S. at 65.
156. IdM at 69-70.
157. Id. at 70.
158. Id. at 73-75.
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was at least in some tension with the many cases protecting corporations under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Court backtracked a
little, concluding that MacAndrews & Forbes was entitled to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures (but hinting that reasonableness meant
something different here than in Boyd) and that the subpoena in this case had
been unreasonably overbroad t59 Although this sounds like a major victory
for Hale's position, the Court closed its opinion with an admonition that
seemed designed to protect broad subpoena power in future cases: "[We do
not wish to be understood as holding that an examination of the books of a
corporation, if duly authorized by act of Congress, would constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment."' t6 If this
language was meant to prevent future claims like Hale's, it did the trick. From
then on, subpoenas for corporate documents were quashed only when
compliance was too burdensome or when the subpoenas asked for irrelevant
materials.16' The notion of any Boyd-type protection for corporations,
whether grounded in the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth, was dead.
This decision prompted a sharp dissent by Justice Brewer and Chief Justice
Fuller.62 The dissenters argued that if corporations were "persons" under the
Fourteenth Amendment, they surely were "persons" under the Fifth,' 63 and
relied on Boyd for the proposition that the Constitution barred subpoenas for
documents as evidence. t64 Judged by the use of conventional legal authorities
and analysis, the dissent had the better argument on both points. But the
strength of the dissent's position only highlights the odd nature of the Hale
majority's reasoning. The Court did not reject constitutional privacy protection
for corporations because such protection was unnecessary, or because the
owners' and employees' privacy was already sufficiently protected, or for any
other principled reason. The Court rejected Hale's main arguments because
doing otherwise "would practically nullify" the Sherman Act-and, one might
add, a great deal else. The principle of Boyd ran squarely into the emerging
regulatory state, and the principle lost.
159. Id. at 75-77.
160. Id. at 77.
161. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 375-76 (1911). The upshot is that subpoenas
are subject to only the weakest of legal constraints. See generally SARA S. BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON,
GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 6:09, 6:26-27 (1986); 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 274-275 (1982) (summarizing federal law on production of documents and motions
to quash).
As if to seal the point that Hale limited Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims alike, the second edition
of Wigmore's treatise, published seventeen years after Hale, notes that the corporate officer who is directed
to produce the document might possibly have a Fifth Amendment claim, and notes further that the
corporation itself does not have such a claim; however, Wigmore makes no mention of the possibility that
the corporation might have a Fourth Amendment claim. See 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2200, at 672-73 (2d ed. 1923).
162. Hale, 201 U.S. at 83 (Brewer, J., joined by Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 83-88.
164. Id. at 88.
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Hale's timing is interesting. The case followed the Court's decision in
Lochner v. New York by only a year. It might seem odd that the same Court
that decided Lochner would backtrack on a constitutional
protection-especially over a vigorous dissent by Brewer and Fuller, two
members of the Lochner majority-on the ground that the constitutional
protection might disable the government from regulating business. Yet the
relationship between Hale and Lochner may not be so odd after all. The initial
decade of the twentieth century saw the beginnings of a substantial political
challenge to the minimalist state. Theodore Roosevelt was President,
progressivism was politically ascendant, Congress was about to pass the Food
and Drug Law, and states were passing workers' compensation statutes and
other regulatory legislation.165 In 1906, Congress and state legislatures were
obviously more interested in regulation than their counterparts had been two
decades earlier, when Boyd was decided.
These developments might have undercut Lochner as much as Boyd, but
Lochner-style substantive due process had a major advantage that Boyd
lacked-flexibility. Substantive due process allowed room for maneuver in
defining what was a public purpose within the police power, and what was
mere wealth transfer and hence unconstitutional. 166 As the Court soon
showed in the famous "Brandeis Brief' cases, 167 substantive due process
could be quite discriminating; if the Court determined that there was a genuine
health or safety interest, the state's desire to regulate might easily be
accommodated. This allowed the Court to strike down some regulation without
striking down all (or even most). With Lochner, the Court could pick and
choose.
Boyd, on the other hand, was indiscriminate: the concern with protecting
the secrecy of one's papers applied across the board. Nothing in the nature of
the privacy interest suggested a distinction between good regulation and bad.
To be sure, there is a way Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrine might have
developed that would have made Boyd very Lochner-like. The Court might
have retreated from Boyd's absolute protection to a balanced protection,
165. For good general discussions, see ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR., PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICA (1974);
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955); GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT, 1900-1912 (1958).
166. See sources cited supra note 113. The line between legitimate regulation of health, safety, or
public morals and illegitimate "taking from A to give to B" was a fine one, as the less famous of the two
Lochner dissents shows. Justice Harlan, joined by two of his colleagues, wrote a sharp and powerful dissent
arguing that the regulation of bakers' hours was a permissible means of protecting public health. See
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65-74 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Unlike Holmes's more famous
opinion, see id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting), Harlan's dissent did not argue that the entire enterprise
of substantive due process was flawed but rather that that enterprise was consistent with the state regulation
at issue. Harlan's argument suggests that substantive due process could be more accommodating of efforts
to regulate the economy than is sometimes supposed.
167. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding maximum hours for manufacturing
employees); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909) (upholding regulation of means by which miners'
wages were calculated); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum hours for women).
1995]
The Yale Law Journal
weighing the government's interest in regulation against the claimant's interest
in nondisclosure. In Hale, this would have meant a decision to uphold the
subpoena power because of the importance of antitrust regulation, leaving the
Court free to strike down other regulatory regimes because the government's
interest in having them could not outweigh the privacy intrusion that would
attend their enforcement. Had the Justices adopted this approach, Lochner and
Boyd might have merged. Both would have allowed for "retail" rather than
"wholesale" invalidation of government regulation, based largely on judges'
and Justices' assessment of the plausibility and strength of the government's
reasons for regulating. 68 But constitutional interest balancing was foreign to
the legal culture of the time. 69
Barring the balancing option, and given the desire not to "practically
nullify" legislation like the Sherman and Interstate Commerce Acts, the Court
had only two options in Hale. One was to do what a later Court would do with
Lochner itself: an about-face, repudiating the doctrine that generated conflict
with the political branches.170 In Hale, that would have meant undoing the
emphasis, which dated back to Entick, on protecting the privacy of one's
papers from government snooping. The other option was the one Hale
embraced: keep Boyd and Entick but cabin them with illogical boundaries,
making the protection non-threatening (or at least non-fatal) to the emergence
of the regulatory state.
The next few decades saw this choice repeated many times. In Marron v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that instrumentalities of crime could be
seized without violating the Fourth or Fifth Amendments, and that
instrumentalities could include documents.17' In Shapiro v. United States, the
Court held that the privilege was not violated by asking someone to produce
required records-i.e., any records that the government ordered him to
keep-no matter how incriminating the records' contents might be. 7 ' Unlike
Hale, these rules applied to searches and subpoenas directed at individuals.
Together with Hale, they left Boyd largely inapplicable to the burgeoning
world of government regulation. Even the records in Boyd itself might
plausibly have been instrumentalities under Marron, and the documents sought
in the various ICC cases of the 1890s might well have been judged required
records a half century later.
These restrictions on Boyd's scope may have been a good thing. They
were surely necessary if the New Deal was to avoid Fourth and Fifth
Amendment challenge. But they are not consistent with the privacy norm that
168. See Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1031-34.
169. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943,
948-52 (1987).
170. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
171. 275 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1927).
172. 335 U.S. 1, 32-35 (1948).
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Boyd-and Wilkes and Entick before it-sought to protect. Shapiro's required
records doctrine makes the point most plainly, since it allows the government
to obtain anything, however private, by the simple expedient of making its
existence mandatory. Tellingly, Supreme Court opinions applying Hale,
Marron, and Shapiro have the same result-oriented character as Justice
Brown's majority in Hale. The opinions barely take a stab at justifying curbs
on Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection, aside from noting the obvious fact
that without the curbs, government regulation of business would be a good
deal harder.
173
Hale set the tone for Fourth and Fifth Amendment law in the twentieth
century. Privacy retained a place of honor, but only within boundaries that had
nothing whatever to do with privacy, boundaries that made sense precisely as
a means of de-fanging privacy protection. It is as if in the decades after 1937,
instead of repudiating Lochner, 74 the Court had repeatedly reaffirmed it-but
applied it only to laws regulating bakers. Hale and its progeny resolved the
conflict between privacy protection and substantive government power, but
only by fiat.
V. FROM BOYD TO INCORPORATION AND BEYOND
Today, Fourth and Fifth Amendment law has almost nothing to do with
the ICC or antitrust investigations. The main point of those bodies of law is
to regulate the police. This regulation is no small affair; modem Fourth and
Fifth Amendment law governs the day-to-day decisions about how police make
arrests and gather evidence and question suspects. It has gone from being
nearly irrelevant to ordinary criminal investigation to dominating ordinary
criminal investigation. How this came about is a large part of the story of
twentieth-century criminal procedure.
That story contains an important twist. A new and different kind of
constitutional criminal procedure arose during the twentieth century, and
almost displaced the privacy-protective law spawned by Entick and Wilkes and
173. An unusually blunt example is the Court's explanation in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694
(1944), of why officials of a labor union are not entitled to claim the privilege with respect to documents
that belong to the union:
The reason underlying the restriction of this constitutional privilege to natural individuals
acting in their own private capacity is clear. The scope and nature of the economic activities
of incorporated and unincorporated organizations and their representatives demand that the
constitutional power of the federal and state governments to regulate those activities be
correspondingly effective. The greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an organization
or its representatives is usually to be found in the official records and documents of that
organization. Were the cloak of the privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and
documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossible.
Id. at 700. At the close of this discussion, the Court cited Hale. See id.
174. Though Lochner was plainly dead after West Coast Hotel, the Court did not repudiate it by name
for some time. See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535-36
(1949).
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Boyd. The rise of police forces-the great story of nineteenth-century criminal
justice 75-predictably led courts to worry not about the seizure of papers but
about coercion and violence. Police officers do not just look for evidence; they
force people to do things. The force may be gentle or subtle, or it may be
harsh, even brutal. By the mid-twentieth century, a growing body of due
process case law reflected courts' concern with this danger. Thus, by about
1950, Fourth and Fifth Amendment law was almost an empty shell (due to
cases like Shapiro, Marron, and Hale), while due process cases concerned with
regulating police coercion seemed about to take over the law of criminal
procedure.
Yet the takeover never happened. The due process cases all but died out,
and Fourth and Fifth Amendment law suddenly became the chief vehicle for
regulating the police. In the 1960s, Boyd's concern with shielding evidence
from the government's prying eyes came to dominate the law of police
investigation of crime. That development produced a strange state of affairs.
The Fourth Amendment, now the primary body of law that regulates day-to-
day police work, is anchored in the same privacy value that protected
eighteenth-century pamphleteers and nineteenth-century railroads-a privacy
value that originally had nothing to do with ordinary criminal law enforcement.
Meanwhile, police coercion and violence, which have a lot to do with ordinary
law enforcement, are mostly ignored; they lie at the fringes of constitutional
regulation. Privacy lies at the core.
A. From Boyd to Mapp and Miranda
After Hale v. Henkel and decisions like it, Fourth and Fifth Amendment
law did not matter much to ordinary criminal cases, for reasons that are by
now familiar. Search-incident-to-arrest law, combined with Marron's
instrumentalities rule and Shapiro's required records doctrine, meant that the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments almost never prevented the government from
getting the information it wanted. This was true even of federal investigations
(the only thing Boyd and its progeny directly limited), and it was true even
though the exclusionary rule became a part of federal criminal procedure not
long after Hale.176 A standard argument in the pre-Mapp v. Ohio debate
about the exclusionary rule was that it had caused no significant disruption to
175. See generally DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT OF CRIME
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE, 1800-1887 (1979) (tracing rise of police to changes in
nature and complexity of urban crime); ERIC MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920 (1981)
(emphasizing shift in police function from provision of social services to crime control). For the best
discussion of the implications of the rise of police forces for Fourth Amendment law and theory, see
Steiker, supra note 36, at 832-38.
176. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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federal criminal investigations.177 This argument was apparently right, based
on the absence of any sustained complaint about the exclusionary rule's
effects. Probably the biggest difference the exclusionary rule made where it
applied (as it did in a number of states by the 1950s) was in forcing officers
to get warrants for house searches. Yet that effect alone was probably not very
important. It never has been clear that the warrant requirement itself matters
much, at least if it is limited to houses and other buildings,17 ' and in any
event house searches are only a small part of criminal law enforcement. The
bottom line is that the presence or absence of the exclusionary rule did not
matter much because the underlying Fourth and Fifth Amendment law did not
matter much.
Into this vacuum came the new law of criminal procedure. The growth of
police forces throughout the nineteenth century brought in its wake some
disturbing patterns of evidence gathering, patterns that looked quite different
from the kinds of cases that dominated Fourth and Fifth Amendment law.
1 79
The courts responded-slowly, but eventually. In 1931, the Wickersham
Commission published a report discussing "the third degree;"' 0 a portion of
the report catalogued many then-recent state court decisions suppressing
confessions because of the violent methods by which those confessions had
been obtained.181 A law of confessions, generated by state courts and quite
independent of Boyd-style self-incrimination doctrine, was evolving in the early
decades of this century.
For a long time this development did not touch federal constitutional
law.182 That changed in 1936 with Brown v. Mississippi.18 3 Beginning with
Brown and continuing over the course of the next two decades, the Supreme
Court incorporated the essence of these state court decisions into federal
constitutional law through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
177. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1960) ("The federal courts themselves
have operated under the exclusionary rule of Weeks for almost half a century; yet it has not been
suggested... that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has thereby been rendered ineffective ... .
178. See Stuntz, supra note 63, at 885-97.
179. See, e.g., Mark H. Hailer, Historical Roots of Police Behavior: Chicago, 1890-1925, 10 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 303, 317-21 (1976) (discussing patterns of police violence).
180. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Walter H. Pollak & Carl S. Stem, The Third Degree, in WICKERSHAM
COMMISSION, No. 11: REPORT ON LAWLEsSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMErr 13 (1931) (discussing state
confessions cases). The Wickersham Commission, appointed by President Hoover, investigated a number
of aspects of criminal law enforcement, most famously the breakdown in enforcement of the Prohibition
laws.
181. Id. at 52-83 (discussing appellate decisions from 1920s).
182. The great exception is Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), in which the Court reversed
a federal conviction on the ground that the defendant's confession "must necessarily have been the result
of either hope or fear, or both, operating on the mind." Id. at 562. Bran was a Fifth Amendment case, and
it might have represented the merger of Fifth Amendment law with the state voluntariness cases later
surveyed in the Wickersham Commission report. But Brain was simply ignored; it basically lay dormant
until shortly before Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), when the Fifth Amendment was again
applied to ordinary police interrogation.
183. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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Amendment. This line of criminal due process cases was new in two respects.
The cases applied to the state courts, where the great majority of day-to-day
criminal litigation takes place."e4 More important still, Brown and its progeny
arose out of and were designed to regulate police behavior in ordinary criminal
investigations. And the regulation was aimed at a particular kind of police
behavior. These cases were not at all about privacy protection; one sees no
paeans to Boyd and Entick and "the privacies of life" here. Nor did they have
anything to do with the scope of government power to define crimes. Most of
the major decisions were in homicide cases, hardly an area where government
regulation is thought to be a problem. Instead, the point of this line of cases
was to limit police coercion and violence.
The cases eventually covered both police interrogation and searches and
seizures, though more attention was paid to the former than to the latter. In
Brown itself, the police beat a confession out of the defendant and, tellingly,
barely bothered to hide their behavior;' 85 the Court found the confession
inadmissible because it was involuntary. 86 Subsequent confessions cases
tended to involve allegations of beatings together with other kinds of physical
intimidation, such as the denial of sleep or food8 7 or extended
incommunicado incarceration. 8 By the late 1950s the cases started to shift
ground, with the Court taking Boyd-style privacy and autonomy arguments and
claims of "psychological coercion" more seriously.189 But for most of the
1940s and 1950s, the due process confessions cases focused squarely on
whether the police had used too much force-and in this context "force" had
an overtly physical cast.
The due process search and seizure cases, though fewer, fit the same
pattern. In Rochin v. California, the police had the defendant's stomach
184. The line of criminal due process cases dated back to Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884),
which held that the Due Process Clause did not require the use of grand juries. For a long time Hurtado
generated little law, but that began to change early in the twentieth century. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927) (holding that biased judge denies due process); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (holding
that mob-dominated trial denies due process). Brown's innovation was to apply this line of cases to police
practices.
185. 297 U.S. at 281-85.
186. Id. at 285-86.
187. E.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (defendant questioned continuously for 36
hours); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (defendant questioned continuously, save for meal
breaks, from Sunday evening until early Tuesday morning).
188. E.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (defendant held for 16 days with no outside
contact before confessing); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (defendant held for a week with no
outside contact before confessing).
189. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (remanding for determination of
voluntariness of defendant's confession because assistant police chief, in defendant's presence, pretended
to order officers to arrest defendant's wife); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (finding defendant's
confession involuntary partially on grounds of false sympathy aroused when police officer, a childhood
friend of defendant, falsely claimed to face job trouble if defendant failed to confess); Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191, 198 (1957) (finding confession involuntary notwithstanding absence of any evidence of
physical mistreatment in light of defendant's "weak[ness] of will or mind" and hence his susceptibility to
psychological pressure).
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pumped in order to recover two morphine capsules."9 The Supreme Court
reversed the defendant's conviction on drug charges on the ground that such
a search "shocks the conscience." 191 The defendant in Irvine v. California
used Rochin to argue that his conviction should be overturned, but the Court
rejected Irvine's argument, even though the police had repeatedly entered his
home and tapped his phone illegally."9 Rochin and Irvine suggested that the
Justices' consciences would be shocked only where some grossly improper use
of physical force was involved. Stealth and snooping, even when plainly
illegal, would not be enough to violate due process. 93
By the 1950s, then, there was a body of constitutional doctrine that posed
an alternative to the Entick-Boyd tradition of privacy-based criminal procedure.
Unlike Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, that doctrine had nothing to do with
substantively problematic crimes or regulatory disputes. Also unlike Fourth and
Fifth Amendment law, that doctrine applied to run-of-the-mill criminal cases.
Indeed, the due process cases of the 1930s and after were the first body of
constitutional law to govern ordinary police work. But in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, just as it was picking up steam, the new due process of criminal
investigation came under sustained attack, both from some of the Justices194
190. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
191. Id. at 172.
192. 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954) (plurality opinion).
193. This was the explicit justification for the decision in Irvine. See id. (emphasizing that Rochin
involved "coercion ... applied by a physical assault upon [defendant's] person"); id. at 139 (Clark, J.,
concurring) (declining to extend Rochin "beyond the clear cases of physical coercion and brutality" like
Rochin itself).
194. For an early example, see Justice Black's stinging separate opinion in Rochin, which highlighted
the contentless character of the "shock the conscience" standard. 342 U.S. at 175-77 (Black, J., concurring).
See also Justice Clark's concurrence in Irvine, 347 U.S. at 138-39 (Clark, J., concurring), which
characterized the Court's approach as follows:
[T]his makes for such uncertainty and unpredictability that it would be impossible to
foretell--other than by guesswork-just how brazen the invasion of the intimate privacies of
one's home must be in order to shock itself into the protective arms of the Constitution. In
truth, the practical result of this ad hoc approach is simply that when five Justices are
sufficiently revolted by local police action, a conviction is overturned and a guilty man may go
free.... We may thus vindicate the abstract principle of due process, but we do not shape the
conduct of local police one whit; unpredictable reversals on dissimilar fact situations are not
likely to curb the zeal of those police and prosecutors who may be intent on racking up a high
percentage of successful prosecutions.
This argument seems to have played a substantial role in the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), to apply the exclusionary rule-and thus, in practice, the Fourth Amendment-to the states.
See i&. at 664-66 (Black, J., concurring) (praising Court's decision to "clear up th[e] uncertainty"
surrounding Rochin and Irvine and to rely on "the precise, intelligible and more predictable constitutional
doctrine enunciated in the Boyd case").
There was a parallel development in the confessions cases. Beginning in 1958, Justice Douglas,
usually joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Brennan, argued repeatedly that the
voluntariness test should be replaced with a right-to-counsel analysis. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 637-41 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324-26 (1959) (Douglas,
J., concurring); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441-48 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). A major
attraction of the right to counsel seems to have been its perceived rule-like quality. See Culombe, 367 U.S.
at 637 (Douglas, J., concurring) (highlighting ease of applying proposed right to counsel rule); Crooker,
357 U.S. at 443-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting difficulty of deciding whether confession is coerced).
This strand of argument, of course, leads directly to the trio of major confessions cases of the mid-1960s,
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and in the law reviews. 195 The attack followed these lines: Standards like
"voluntariness" and "shock the conscience" are impossibly vague, so much so
as to be almost without content. Because the law has no content, the police
ignore it and do what they want. Rules are needed, and the rules must have
bite. 196 Always somewhere near the surface of this criticism was an image:
a black suspect being roughed up by white police officers. 9 7 This is of
course no surprise; critics of the new criminal procedure were writing only a
few years after another, more famous Brown decision. And the specter of black
suspects abused by white cops was quite real.' 98 It lent great force to the
claim that constitutional regulation of the police was necessary, and that the
sort of regulation provided by the due process cases was much too thin.
This was an argument perfectly designed for a Supreme Court that had just
struck down school segregation, and was about to rewrite several other areas
of law on thinly veiled racial grounds.199 Asked to do something about police
all of which used the right to counsel to regulate the interrogation process. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
195. The attacks in the literature were generally aimed at the Court's confessions cases. See, e.g., Yale
Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRI AL
JUSTICE IN OUR TIME I (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965); Yale Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary"
Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS
L. REV. 728, 735-59 (1963); Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Crime and Confession, 79 HARV. L. REV. 21
(1965); Note, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935 (1966). For an early example
of the same sorts of criticisms, see Monrad G. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree,
6 STAN. L. REV. 411 (1954) (emphasizing both evanescence of voluntariness standard and gap between
"lav in the books" and law as applied in police stations). For a similar criticism applied to the Court's due
process methodology in general, see Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process
Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
Most of the literature prior to the 1960s expressed no view as to the wisdom of the Court's
confessions cases, though (oddly to modem eyes) the tone of the discussion usually suggested concern that
the Court was being too interventionist. See JOHN M. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 121-54 (1959);
Francis A. Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U. L. REV. 16
(1953); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 10-14 (1956).
196. This view led to a number of academic calls for "codes" of one sort or another to solve the police
interrogation problem. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and
the Right to Counsel, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 62 (1966); Arnold N. Ender & Sheldon H. Elsen, Counsel for
the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47 (1964).
197. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and
Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1095-96 (1959) (noting that it is often "good politics" for police
to flout civil liberties because victims are so often minorities). Of course, the same image played a large
part in the Court's early voluntariness decisions. See Bennett Boskey & John H. Pickering, Federal
Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U. CHI. L. REV. 266, 283-86 (1946) (highlighting role of race
in Court's post-Brown v. Mississippi voluntariness decisions).
198. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON THE POLICE, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT. THE POLICE 146-48, 164-65, 167-69 (1967).
199. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (constitutionality of poll
taxes); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (definition of adequate and independent state ground of
decision); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (First Amendment application to libel
law); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (waiver of claims in habeas corpus); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958) (right of free association). It cannot be proven that these cases are all "about" race, and some
do not involve black litigants. But the facts of NAACP v. Alabama and New York imes Co. v. Sullivan
powerfully suggest institutionalized racism; it seems hard to imagine the Court taking such aggressive First
Amendment stands were that not so. In Fay v. Noia and Henry v. Mississippi, the Court dramatically
expanded the power of federal courts to review state court decisions, a logical step in a world in which
some state court systems could not be trusted to play fair in cases with black criminal defendants. Lastly,
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misconduct, the Court responded with enthusiasm. Beginning in 1961 with
Mapp v. Ohio and extending through the rest of that eventful decade, the Court
created a constitutional code of police conduct. In the place of the fuzzy and
lax "voluntariness" and "shocks the conscience" standards the Court
established rules, and the rules did have bite.
That part of the story is familiar, but there is a feature of the story we tend
to ignore today. The Court's intervention in criminal procedure took an
extremely important but not at all inevitable turn. Perhaps because the due
process cases had been discredited by the critics of the 1950s and early 1960s,
the idea of serious constitutional regulation of the police did not build on the
due process cases of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s-notwithstanding the fact
that those cases were the only body of constitutional law aimed, start to finish,
at the police. Instead, constitutional regulation of the police came to be linked
to incorporation of the Bill of Rights, particularly the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. The Court followed this strategy in both Mapp v. Ohio (which
made incorporation of the Fourth Amendment meaningful),200 and Miranda
v. Arizona (applying the Fifth Amendment to police interrogation).20'
Throughout the 1960s, the Justices who sought greater restrictions on the
police did so through the Bill of Rights, and the Justices who challenged those
restrictions rested their arguments on the due process cases of the 1930s,
1940s, and 1950s.20 2
Notice where this left matters. The Fourth and Fifth Amendment law that
the Court applied to the states in the 1960s was the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment law that had been shaped by Boyd. Accordingly, along with the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Court incorporated Boyd's focus on privacy
protection. When the Court intervened aggressively in criminal procedure, it
did more than increase the level of regulation. It changed the purpose of
constitutional regulation, from the due process cases' focus on police coercion
and violence to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' traditional emphasis on
privacy, autonomy, and the ability of individuals to keep information to
themselves.
The change in purpose may well have been an accident. There is no
evidence that the Court was engaged in a serious rethinking of the point of
regulating day-to-day police work, no evidence of a conscious decision to
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections invalidated a system of regulating voter qualifications that had
historically been used to disenfranchise black voters throughout much of the South.
200. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
201. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
202. Thus Justice Harlan became the great adversary of interventionist criminal procedure-he
dissented in both Mapp and Miranda, and in most of the other major criminal procedure decisions of the
decade as well-and the same Justice Harlan was also the great defender of case-by-case due process
adjudication. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173-93 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Miranda, 384
U.S. at 506-14 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 17-27 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Meanwhile, almost all the major new rules of criminal procedure--the rules whose creation Harlan
opposed-were crafted under the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments.
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deemphasize coercion and stress privacy. Incorporation seems to have flowed
out of a desire to rein in state criminal justice systems, while the emphasis on
privacy flowed out of incorporation, almost as an afterthought. Not that the
text of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments dictated this emphasis. The Fifth
Amendment reads more naturally as a limit on police coercion, since the text
bars only "compelled" self-incrimination. 3 Meanwhile, the Fourth
Amendment protects not only "houses, papers, and effects" (the stuff of
privacy), but "persons" as well.2" And it forbids "unreasonable" searches
and seizures without specifying what makes a search or seizure unreasonable.
Nothing in the constitutional text dictates that reasonableness should turn on
what a police officer saw and what he knew when he saw it rather than on
how much force he used. Fourth and Fifth Amendment law in the 1960s
focused on protecting privacy not because the text required it, but because
Boyd and Entick required it. Of course, privacy protection in Boyd and Entick
had no more to do with the problems of police misconduct in the 1960s than
Lochner or the First Amendment have to do with the Rodney King incident.
Nevertheless, after the incorporation cases, Boyd defined what the law that
governed ordinary police investigation of crime was about.
To see what this shift in focus meant, one need only look at the two most
important confessions cases of the 1960s, Massiah v. United States205 and
Miranda v. Arizona.206 In Brown v. Mississippi and its progeny, the Court
sometimes talked about suspects' wills being overborne, but the dominant
focus was always on police tactics, on the amount of force and pressure used.
There was rarely any pretense that the suspect might be entitled to have no
pressure put on him to confess, to act as a completely free and informed agent
in deciding whether to talk to the police. Massiah and Miranda made a sharp
break with this pattern. The majority opinions in both cases were just as
concerned with suspects being tricked into confessing as with more brutal
methods. In Massiah, the defendant spoke to a colleague who was working as
an undercover government agent.207 Notwithstanding that the defendant had
been under no pressure to talk at all, the Court suppressed the statements
because formal criminal proceedings had begun and the government
"questioning" violated Massiah's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.20" In
Miranda, the Court based its holding on the Fifth Amendment rather than the
Sixth, so naturally there was more talk about police coercion. The Court made
clear, however, that "coercion" in this setting meant anything that impeded a
rational, informed choice by the suspect-hence the famous warnings,
203. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
204. Id. amend. IV.
205. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
206. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
207. 377 U.S. at 201-03.
208. Id. at 204-06.
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combined with the admonition that the government bore a "heavy burden" of
showing that any waiver of the Miranda rights must be made "voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently."209 Both Massiah and Miranda treated police
questioning much the way Boyd had treated the subpoena for customs invoices:
the information belonged to the defendant, it was private, and the government
had no right to get it unless the defendant chose-really chose-to give it up.
Boyd's rebirth was even more visible in search and seizure law. Before the
1960s, the Fourth Amendment imposed no meaningful limits on local
police;2t0 for them, the constitutional law of search and seizure came from
Rochin and Irvine, the pair of 1950s due process cases that barred police
conduct that shocked judicial consciences. Rochin and Irvine forbade extreme
forms of police coercion but ignored privacy; pumping the suspect's stomach
to retrieve swallowed drugs was shocking but illegally entering his apartment
was not.2n After the 1960s, the threshold question in search and seizure
analysis was whether the police had infringed a "reasonable expectation of
privacy.' '212 And the first two Supreme Court decisions defining that standard
concerned electronic eavesdropping.2 3 The focus was on what the police
could see and hear, not on the amount of force they could use.
The shift from Rochin and Irvine to Boyd-style privacy protection in search
and seizure law was accompanied by two other developments that dramatically
increased the law's effect on ordinary police practices. First, the Court
decoupled privacy protection from property rights, holding that electronic
eavesdropping would constitute a "search" even if it involved no trespass.
2 4
Second, old-style vagrancy and loitering laws were invalidated, practically
across the board.21 5 (The ostensible reason was that they were too vague, but
the atmosphere of the cases suggests the real reason was fear that these laws
were being used in racially discriminatory ways. 216) These laws had in effect
209. 384 U.S. at 444, 475.
210. Under Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Fourth Amendment technically applied to the
states, but because there was no constitutionally required remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, Wolf
made little practical difference to the police. The real decision to apply the Fourth Amendment to local
police came in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
211. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
212. The test comes from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
213. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
214. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. At the same time, the Court did away with the so-called "mere evidence"
rule, which barred the seizure of evidence that did not fall into some unprotected category, such as
contraband, instrumentalities of crime, or required records. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309-10
(1967) (overruling Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)). The effect of Katz and Warden v.
Hayden was to convert Boyd from an absolute protection of a limited category of evidence to a balanced
protection that applied essentially across the board.
215. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611 (1971).
216. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L.
REV. 189, 218-19 (1985). Note that in Papachristou, the "crime" consisted of two white women and two
black men riding around Jacksonville together. 405 U.S. at 158-59.
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allowed the police to arrest almost anyone, at least on the street.217 Given the
longstanding legality of the search incident to arrest, broad arrest power had
translated into equally broad power to search. Once vagrancy and loitering
statutes began to fall, this picture changed; ordinary street stops and searches
were now subject to constitutional limits that meant something.2"'
Privacy protection thus became the centerpiece of the law of criminal
investigation just as that law became a powerful force for regulating ordinary
police behavior. Plausibly enough, the Court of the 1960s had decided that
serious constitutional regulation was needed and had looked around for the
most available doctrinal tools. The most obvious choice was to build on the
due process cases, since those cases were designed to get at the worst kinds
of police misconduct. But the due process cases looked like the old "separate
but equal" rule-another doctrine that promised more protection than it
delivered. So the Court seized on the most available alternative: the Bill of
Rights, and especially the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. That doctrine,
however, had its roots not in police misconduct but in concerns about the
scope of government power, concerns that had been largely abandoned since
the "switch in time" of 1937. In short, the 1960s left criminal procedure firmly
anchored in a privacy value that had already proved inconsistent with the
modem state. The problem of Hale v. Henkel-what to do when privacy
protection runs into the government's desire to regulate-was now posed all
over again, and on many different fronts.
B. The Aftennath of Incorporation
After the 1960s, Fourth and Fifth Amendment cases diverged in how they
approached that problem. Police interrogation law was reshaped; the privacy-
autonomy value that lay at the core of Miranda was abandoned. The law of
search and seizure, meanwhile, kept its focus on privacy.
The shift in police interrogation doctrine basically took Miranda's rules
and turned them to Brown v. Mississippi's ends. From the outset, Miranda
applied only to custodial interrogation. In a series of cases beginning in 1980,
the Court defined "interrogation" to mean only tactics that looked to the
suspect like police questioning-leaving the police free to engage in deceptive
questioning, including the use of undercover agents, without being subject to
217. For the usefulness of vagrancy and loitering laws as a blanket authorization to arrest, see William
0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. I (1960). Cf. JOHNSON, supra note 175, at
132 (noting that nineteenth-century police "interpreted vagrancy statutes liberally as a means of regulating
the conduct of professional thieves").
218. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power,
and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553, 560 n.29 (1992) (discussing relationship between Terry
doctrine and constitutional challenges to vagrancy and loitering laws).
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Miranda's restrictions. Moreover, the Court made clear that mistakes and
misunderstandings by the suspect would not invalidate a waiver of Miranda
rights, as long as the suspect knew that he did not have to talk.22 The police
are now free to "persuade, trick or cajole" the suspect into talking.Y' But
they are not free to coerce confessions: if the suspect calls a halt to questioning
it must cease,' and if he asks for a lawyer it may not resume save at the
suspect's instigation.'m These rules make sense only as tools for regulating
the level of pressure the police may use (hence the suspect's ability to stop
questioning, combined with the officer's ability to use deceptive tactics to get
him to talk). Miranda doctrine has survived, but its goal is now the same as
the goal of the pre-1966 voluntariness cases.
This fits a larger pattern in Fifth Amendment law. Thirty years ago Boyd
still dominated thinking about the privilege; privacy talk was common in Fifth
Amendment law and literature.22 4 Today the cases focus much more on
preventing the state from putting defendants to the choice between confession
and perjury.2as Thus, the privilege no longer protects physical evidence;
226
219. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Innis, two police officers exchanged comments in the suspect's
presence about the danger that some child might happen on the missing murder weapon if it were not
found; the suspect broke into this "conversation" to tell the officers where the gun was. 446 U.S. at 294-95.
The Court found no interrogation. Id. at 302-03. In Mauro, the defendant, charged with killing his son, was
put in a room with his wife, who was also a prime suspect. The police placed an officer and a tape recorder
in the room to monitor the conversation, which predictably produced incriminating statements by the
defendant. 481 U.S. at 522-23. Once again, the Court found no interrogation, emphasizing (significantly)
that the police had done nothing coercive. Id. at 527-30. Perkins seals the point. There the government
placed an undercover agent in the suspect's jail cell; the resulting conversation and questions once again
did not count as interrogation, once again because they were not coercive. 496 U.S. at 296-300.
220. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
In Barrett, the suspect told his interrogators that he would talk (with a tape recorder in the room) but would
make no written statement. 479 U.S. at 525-26. This choice either rested on a serious
misunderstanding-Barrett probably thought that the oral statement wouldn't count for as much as
something on paper, when in fact a taped confession would be better for the government than a typed
one-or it was simply foolish. The Court nevertheless found Barrett's waiver of his Miranda rights valid,
saying: "The fact that some might find Barrett's decision illogical is irrelevant, for we have never
'embraced the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their
voluntariness."' Id. at 530 (footnote omitted) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985)). Burbine
is to the same effect. There the police failed to tell the suspect that a lawyer had been hired for him and
was trying to contact him. 475 U.S. at 416-18. The Court nevertheless found the suspect's waiver
"knowing" and "intelligent" because he understood that he did not have to talk, and the police were under
no obligation to tell him things that might bear on his decision. Id. at 421-23.
221. Of course, Miranda itself says the opposite. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966)
(suggesting that police may not "persuade, trick, or cajole [the suspect] out of exercising his constitutional
rights"). That is a good indication of the change the last three decades have wrought in Miranda doctrine.
222. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975).
223. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); cf. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350
(1994) (invocation of right to counsel must be unequivocal in order to trigger Edwards rule).
224. See sources cited supra note 3.
225. A good example of the change is Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990). In Muniz, the
Court was forced to decide whether a particular question asked during the course of "booking" the
defendant called for a testimonial response. After reciting the laundry list of purposes for the privilege, the
Court proceeded to analyze the question in terms of whether it put the defendant to a choice among
confession, perjury, and contempt. Id. at 596-99. The dissent disagreed with the Court's bottom line, but
not with the approach. The dissent merely argued that the defendant had not been put to the "cruel
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even documents-the heart of Boyd's concern-are unprotected. 7 In Fifth
Amendment law, Boyd's shadow has all but disappeared.
But not in the law of search and seizure, where privacy remains the law's
focus. There, the law has seen a repeat of the early twentieth-century cases that
limited Boyd-irrational doctrinal lines that cabin privacy protection so as not
to cast too large a shadow on the state's many activities outside of criminal
law enforcement. The examples are almost endless. In United States v. Miller,
the Court held, implausibly, that police requests for individuals' banking
records do not infringe a "legitimate expectation of privacy" and so are not
"searches" covered by the Fourth Amendment.228 In terms of privacy
protection, Miller seems ridiculous-people's finances are a lot more private
than other things the Fourth Amendment protects-but if the case were decided
otherwise it might be hard to justify the ease with which other government
regulators can force banks to turn over detailed information about depositors
and investors. In United States v. Dionisio, the Court confirmed that subpoenas
for documents are subject to no serious Fourth Amendment constraints.2 9
Shortly thereafter, Fisher v. United States removed most of the remaining Fifth
Amendment constraints on subpoenas by holding that the privilege against self-
incrimination protects only the act of producing subpeonaed evidence and not
the evidence itself3 0 This left subpoenas practically unregulated; as long as
the request is relevant to some legitimate investigation and compliance is not
too burdensome, the target of the subpoena must hand over the goods (or the
papers). 3 Once again, this bottom line is nonsense in privacy terms.
Subpoenas can and do require disclosure of material that is much more private
than the sorts of things police officers find in car searches, yet the subpoenas
are much less heavily regulated than the searches. On the other hand, given the
reliance of administrative agencies on the subpoena power, any other decision
trilemma" of confession, perjury, or contempt. See id. at 606-08 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
226. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (compelled blood test does not violate
privilege). Interestingly, Schmerber, which inaugurated the privilege's shift away from privacy, was decided
the same month as Miranda, a classically privacy-protective decision.
227. Under Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), documents are not protected, though the act
of producing them is protected if it has testimonial content. For a good explanation of what this means, see
Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV.
1 (1987). Note that the nonprotection of the documents themselves apparently applies even to the most
private sorts of papers. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated October 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87
(2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that personal calendar was protected, notwithstanding assumption that
calendar was an extremely personal document); Senate Select Comm. on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp.
17 (D.D.C. 1994) (rejecting argument that Senator Packwocd's diaries are protected by Fifth Amendment
against subpoena by Senate Ethics Committee during course of investigation of sexual harrassment claims).
228. 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
229. 410 U.S. 1 (1973). Dionisio limits Fourth Amendment challenges to cases in which the subpoena
is "too sweeping in its terms 'to be regarded as reasonable."' Id. at 11 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 76 (1906)). There is no requirement of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
230. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
231. See sources cited supra note 161.
[Vol. 105: 393
Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure
would pose real problems for much of the government outside the realm of
ordinary criminal procedure. Dionisio and Fisher are modem-day analogues to
Hale, cases that protect the government's ability to regulate by protecting its
ability to subpoena documents.
Finally, in a series of cases involving searches by government officials
other than police officers-principals searching students,232 government
employers searching employees' offices,z3 government regulators searching
businesses--the Court has consistently declined to apply ordinary Fourth
Amendment standards, adopting instead a kind of rational basis scrutiny that
holds the (non-police) search legal unless it was outrageous. 35 This too flies
in the face of privacy protection, since one's privacy interest does not depend
on whether one is being searched by a police officer or a school principal. Any
other result, however, would embroil the Court in constitutional regulation of
a wide range of government activities, regulation that might look suspiciously
Lochner-like. If government regulators had to have probable cause before
searching a regulated business, the regulators could simply make their
regulations more extensive and detailed so that probable cause would always
be present. The only way to stop this end run would be to restrain the
regulators' ability to regulate as they wish. If government employers could not
search employees' file cabinets, the file cabinets could be moved elsewhere or
taken away, or the employers could act on unverified suspicions of employee
misconduct. In order to restrict the employers' search authority, the law would
have to restrict their authority to allocate assignments and resources among
employees. And if school principals were forbidden to open secure lockers to
look for drugs, secure lockers might disappear, and the principals might detain
or suspend some students without resolving their doubts through a search.
Meaningful restraints on searches in schools would be impossible unless
principals' substantive power were curtailed. In all these areas the relevant
government officials can evade search and seizure restrictions by other means.
Thus, serious regulation of searches and seizures would have to be
accompanied by serious limits on those "other means"--that is, limits on the
relevant officials' substantive authority. 1
6
The fundamental problem in these cases is essentially the same as the
problem with Boyd. Strong privacy protection naturally implies strong limits
232. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
233. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
234. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
235. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1,
42-43 (1991) (emphasizing laxity of Court's Fourth Amendment review in these cases); Stuntz, supra note
218, at 553-54 (equating Fourth Amendment standard in these cases with rational basis constitutional
review). For criticism of the lenient standards adopted in the various non-police search cases, see 3 & 4
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 10.2(a), 10.3(d), 10.10(d), 10.11(b) (2d ed. 1987 and Supp.
1995).
236. This argument is developed in Stuntz, supra note 218, at 562-67, 576-85.
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on government power, limits that we have rejected for at least the past half
century. The only way out of that problem is to place arbitrary bounds on
privacy protection. And there is another legacy of Boyd and the incorporation
cases. By focusing on privacy, Fourth Amendment law has largely abandoned
the due process cases' concern with coercion and violence. Not until 1985 did
the Supreme Court define Fourth Amendment limits on the use of deadly force
by the police,237 and even now the case law is thin. 8 Meanwhile, the case
law on the use of non-deadly force is close to nonexistent. Current doctrine
consists of the vacuous principle that the legality of police use of force
depends on "careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.""n9 One
searches in vain for a body of law that gives this "standard" some content.
The result is that police violence is regulated when it occurs in the
interrogation room and somewhat regulated when it causes someone's death,
but otherwise is pretty much left alone. The vast majority of the many rules
that govern how the police deal with suspects do not concern the level of force
the police can apply. Rather, those rules govern what the police can see or
hear.24 Boyd may be dead in Fifth Amendment law, but its spirit lives on
in the law of search and seizure.
We are left with a very odd set of constitutional rules for police work.
Privacy is protected, but only sometimes, and force and violence are usually
ignored. This is the upshot of a regime grounded on norms that do not have
237. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
238. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 235, § 5.1(d), and cases cited therein (discussing deadly force claims).
239. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The only other legal principle to come
out of Graham is the proposition that the governing Fourth Amendment standard is objective. See id. at
397.
240. For another discussion of this point, along with an argument that the law should refocus its
attention on violence and coercion, see Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1062-77. For an argument that the law
already does focus predominantly on violence and coercion, see Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with
Privacy's Problem, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1079, 1086-92 (1995).
Interestingly, the Supreme Court's most recent foray into original intent in the law of search and
seizure cuts against the usual focus on protecting privacy. In Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995),
a unanimous Court held that the Fourth Amendment imposes a modest "knock and announce" requirement
on police officers forcibly entering private homes, on the ground that such a requirement existed at common
law when the Fourth Amendment was written and ratified. Though this requirement has to do with house
searches, it does not protect privacy, at least not in the usual sense: Wilson does not limit what police
officers can see; it limits the level of violence with which they carry out searches. That makes the decision
a far cry from cases like Entick v. Carrington or Wilkes v. Wood.
Not that Wilson represents a major departure in Fourth Amendment law. The rule it states-the police
must knock and announce before entering if such notice is necessary to make the search reasonable (and
the Court expressly avoids saying what reasonableness means in this context), 115 S. Ct. at 1918-19-wil
likely prove trivial in practice. Officers will usually find it easy to argue that it was reasonable not to give
notice of entry. Probably the most important feature of Wilson is methodological: the contemporary Court
has rarely paid much explicit attention to history in its Fourth and Fifth Amendment decisions. Perhaps
Wilson signals a change in that regard. If so, given how little Fourth and Fifth Amendment history has to
do with the real problems of police work, it is a change for the worse.
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their origin in ordinary criminal procedure, norms that are themselves grounded
on a hostility to broad government regulatory power-the Lochner battle,
having been fought and won elsewhere in constitutional law, must be refought,
albeit under the table, throughout Fourth Amendment law. Of course, given
that law's history, its problems are hardly surprising. Boyd, Entick, and Wilkes
were not in any realistic sense criminal procedure cases. No wonder they have
proved a poor foundation for the real-world law of police investigation of
crime.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current law of criminal procedure is indeed about procedure- about
how the police can enforce the law, how they can find evidence and question
suspects, and so forth. But its origins lie in cases that worried little about these
sorts of issues, cases that seem more concerned with what the government
could criminalize or regulate. Functionally, Entick v. Carrington and Wilkes v.
Wood belong together with the debates over the Alien and Sedition Acts and
the prosecution of anarchists and communists earlier this century: all are really
about the protection of political dissent. Functionally, Boyd v. United States
belongs with Lochner v. New York: both are really about placing limits on the
regulatory state. All of these cases have a lot to do with the substantive scope
of government power. None of them has much to do with the police or
ordinary criminal law enforcement. Yet we have constructed a vast system of
rules that still harks back to Entick, Wilkes, and Boyd, rules whose primary
audience is the police and whose primary beneficiaries are criminal suspects.
To put it another way, the part of criminal procedure that concerns
evidence gathering rests on a paradigm-the ransacking of a home, with an
emphasis on rummaging through the occupant's private papers. That paradigm
looks like a police misconduct problem, but historically it has more to do with
the kinds of things government tries to regulate. After all, Mapp v. Ohio, like
Entick and Wilkes, was a house search case that raised free speech issues.
(Remember, Mapp was litigated as a First Amendment case.24 ) The real
problem of police misconduct is best captured by another paradigm: the
Rodney King beating. The law has little to do with that problem. The reason
is that criminal procedure is too true to its history.
241. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672-75 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (complaining about
majority's decision to "reachfl out" and decide exclusionary rule issue in case that was litigated as First
Amendment case). The First Amendment issue in Mapp was whether the state could criminalize the
knowing possession of obscene literature in one's own home. See id. at 673. That issue was resolved
against the state eight years after Mapp, in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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